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Essays on Institutional Investors 
Yang Chen 
 
This dissertation analyzes the role of institutional investors in capital markets. The 
first essay studies what affect mutual fund decisions on hiring and firing sub-
advisors and the ex-post effects. We show that deterioration in mutual fund 
performance or increase in outflows predicts a higher propensity of a fund to 
change its sub-advisors. However, mutual funds continue to underperform by 
about 1% in the 18-months after a change in sub-advisor, even after controlling 
for fund category, past returns and past flows. The continuing underperformance 
of mutual funds can be attributed to decreasing returns for sub-advisors in 
deploying their ability as suggested in Berk and Green (2004). The second essay 
provides empirical analysis on hedge fund exposures to overpriced real estate 
assets. Consistent with models in which delegated portfolio managers may want 
to invest in overpriced assets, I find that hedge funds were holding real estate 
stocks instead of selling short during the period of overpricing (2003Q1-2007Q2). 
The third essay finds that investor composition affect fund managers’ portfolio 
choices. Specifically, I show that retail-oriented hedge funds invested more in 
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Using a comprehensive database of mutual funds and monthly sub-advisor 
information from 2006 to 2012, we document several interesting empirical 
regularities of mutual funds and their sub-advisors around the event of an active 
sub-advisor change. First, deterioration in mutual fund performance or increase in 
outflows predicts a higher propensity of a fund to change its sub-advisors. Second, 
mutual funds chase past performance of sub-advisors. Third, mutual funds 
continue to underperform by about 1% in the 18-months after a change in sub-
advisor, even after controlling for fund category, past returns and past flows. We 
show that the continuing underperformance of mutual funds can be attributed to 
decreasing returns for sub-advisors in deploying their ability as suggested in Berk 
and Green (2004).   
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I. Introduction 
Certain mutual funds outsource their investment management function to an 
outside firm. These funds are generally known as sub-advised funds and their 
investment managers are referred as sub-advisors. The market share of sub-
advised assets was quite stable over the past decade although mutual fund 
industry experienced extraordinary growth. In December 2001, sub-advised 
mutual fund assets (including underlying variable annuities) were $835 billion, 
representing 11% of assets in mutual fund industry1. As of December 2011, sub-
advised assets were $1,489 Billion, or about 12% of the industry. 
Why do certain mutual funds enter into outsourcing contracts with sub-
advisors? Del Guercio, Reuter and Tkac (2007) suggest that these contracts must 
be beneficial to both parties. They argue that one of the benefits for mutual funds 
comes from cost efficiencies. When mutual funds want to expand their line of 
products in which they do not have expertise, the cost could be lower if they hire 
a sub-advisor who is already in place providing these products. The costs might 
be also lower for some mutual funds if they have geographic limitations to retain 
in-house talented portfolio managers. The other benefit is that mutual funds can 
increase demand for their services if sub-advisors provide high quality products 
and well recognized brand names. For sub-advisors, an obvious benefit is that 
                                                      
1 2012 Sub-advisory Study, Strategic Insight. The numbers are consistent with the report published 




   
 
they get paid by providing sub-advisory services. A less obvious benefit is that 
mutual funds and sub-advisors may well be non-competitors if they differ in 
distribution channels. Sub-advisors may get access to a large pool of investors 
that they previously couldn’t. 
Despite these theories, there is empirical evidence that suggests the non-
optimality of these outsourcing contracts. For instance, Chen, Hong and Kubik 
(2011) show that outsourced mutual funds underperform funds that ran internally 
by between 50 and 72 basis points a year. They attribute this phenomenon to 
contractual externalities due to firm boundaries, i.e., outsourced funds face steeper 
sensitivity of fund closures to past performance or excess risk taking, thus they 
take less risk in response. 
In this paper, we study mutual funds and their sub-advisors around the event 
of a sub-advisor change and try to address the following specific questions. First, 
what affects the hiring and firing decisions of a mutual fund regarding its sub-
advisors? Second, how does mutual fund performance change after a sub-advisor 
change? Third, what causes the change in mutual fund performance?  
Answering these questions is important for the following reasons. First, sub-
advisors are motivated to expand their businesses given capacity. On one hand, 




   
 
advisors to expand their size; on the other hand, is it true that the bigger the size 
of sub-advisors the better?  
Second, mutual funds are interested in knowing whether their decisions of 
hiring and firing sub-advisors are effective. Our study serves this need by 
providing empirical evidence on the ex-post effect of sub-advisor change on 
mutual funds and their investors. This would potentially help them making more 
sound hiring and firing decisions regarding sub-advisors. 
Third, investors have been questioning who deliver mutual fund performance. 
They tend to attribute most of fund performance to portfolio managers rather than 
funds. Benefited from the fact that managers and funds are separated by 
construction in our paper, we are able to evaluate whether mutual funds add value 
by removing bad managers and picking better ones.   
We hypothesize that in addition to past performance, there is also an inverse 
relation between mutual fund past flows and the propensity of changing a sub-
advisor. We also hypothesize that there are decreasing returns for sub-advisors in 
deploying their ability, which causes the continuing underperformance of mutual 
funds who change sub-advisors.  
This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, flow-performance 




   
 
literature that mainly study the impact of flows from retail investors on 
investment managers such as hedge funds and mutual funds, we analyze this 
question from a different and quite new angle, i.e., the impact of flows from 
institutional investors (mutual funds) on the performance of sub-advisors. We find 
that consistent with Berk and Green (2004), mutual funds chase sub-advisor 
performance and make rational use of information about sub-advisors’ histories in 
doing so. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to test Berk and 
Green (2004) using institutional flows. Second, our paper shows that there are 
decreasing returns to scale for sub-advisors, which explains the non-persistent 
performances in sub-advisors and mutual funds. Third, our analysis also 
distinguishes from the existing literature that focuses on the relationship of sub-
advisor departure and mutual fund performance and flow (e.g., Kostovetsky and 
Warner (2011)).    
II. Background  
A mutual fund, as defined in Tufano and Sevick (1997), is a legal entity with 
no employees to which investors allocate their portfolio decision rights. The fund, 
in turn, delegates all aspects of fund operation, including portfolio management, 
to an advisor. While it is true that the fund notionally “hires” the advisor, in 




   
 
advisor may keep the portfolio decision rights to itself, it may also choose to 
allocate portfolio decision rights to an independent third party (i.e., sub-advisor). 
In a typical outsourcing agreement, a mutual fund usually retains the 
marketing and distribution fees while the sub-advisor obtains the management 
fees. Chen, Hong and Kubik (2006) document that “Like for any of its funds, the 
family of an outsourced fund, through a board of directors, keeps track of its 
performance and monitors fund activities such as the fund’s risk-taking behavior 
relative to its peers. The advisor retains the ability to replace the sub-advisor or 
close down the fund, while the sub-advisor can manage outsourced funds for 
other advisors as well as funds they market themselves (in-house funds).” Big 
names of mutual fund companies include Vanguard, John Hancock, Fidelity, etc.; 
and large sub-advisors include Wellington, Pimco, AllianceBernstein, etc.  
Generally, investment companies (“funds”) are required to file Form 497 
(definitive materials) to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
report the names of their sub-advisors as well as sub-advisor changes, in 
accordance with Rule 497 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. However, 
according to Rule 15a-5 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, an 




   
 
shareholder vote in most cases. As a result, mutual fund investors are usually not 
aware of the existence of a sub-advisor or its change2. 
The departure of a sub-advisor is usually involuntary and often due to 
underperformance. Friction cost for mutual funds in moving portfolio may take 
2%-5% of TNA (Proszek (2002), Bollen (2004) and Werner (2001)). As a result, 
in performance-based termination, funds would only be willing to incur the costs 
if their performances are expected to improve. For instance, in a recent filing to 
the SEC, AdvisorShares, an investment advisor announced a change in the sub-
advisor for the Mars Hill Global Relative Value ETF. Noah Hamman, the CEO of 
AdvisorShares commented the following: “This change will bring an expert in 
global asset management to a product that has fallen short in performance relative 
to its peers. After reviewing the performance with the current sub-advisor, it was 
concluded that a change was in the best interest of shareholders.”3 
While performance is an important factor in determining a sub-advisor change, 
hiring and firing a sub-advisor usually involves both quantitative and qualitative 
                                                      
2 We show that investors are unaware of sub-advisor changes in Table 6 of this paper.  






   
 
factors. According to a report by Strategic Insight4, quantitative factors include: 
performance,  tracking record; qualitative factors include: investment process, 
knowledge and skills, history, the assets of the firm overall, and within the 
strategy that needs to be outsourced, whether the firms are already near capacity 
for particular investment categories, how different managers work together, if the 
fund is multi-subadvised, prior experience with the fund, brand, reciprocal 
distribution, marketing and sales support, etc. 
III. Data 
A. Data Collection Process 
We acquire a proprietary dataset from Strategic Insight, which includes 
monthly sub-advisor information for U.S. mutual funds from December 2006 to 
September 2012.  The dataset covers 3622 unique mutual funds that are ever sub-
advised during this period and 1112 unique sub-advisors. Since dead funds are not 
removed from the records after liquidation, our proprietary dataset is free of 
survivorship bias. Specifically, the dataset includes for each mutual fund in each 
month end, its sub-advisor names and their respective mandate assets with the 
fund. The dataset also includes a tag which indicates whether a sub-advisor is 
affiliated with the fund on a monthly basis (by affiliation we mean that the fund 
                                                      






   
 
owns the sub-advisor or the fund and the sub-advisor have a common owner). 
This dataset allows us to identify 1871 active sub-advisor changes involving 1219 
unique mutual funds and 842 unique sub-advisors during the period. Note that 
active sub-advisor changes refer to the situations when a fund fires, hires, or hires 
and fires at least one sub-advisor and excludes passive changes including 
liquidation, merger and new funds. 
The proprietary dataset is then supplemented with monthly mutual fund 
information obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
available through WRDS. CRSP provides mutual fund information at the share 
class level5. Given that our analysis is at the fund level, we aggregate share 
classes into a mutual fund by their CRSP Portfolio Number. Then, fund size is 
calculated as the sum of assets under management of all its share classes. We 
define fund age as the number of years since the inception of the most tenured 
share class within that fund. Fund return is calculated as the value weighted return 
of all its share classes. 
We manually match the funds from our proprietary dataset with CRSP Mutual 
Funds database by name. We are able to match 3,214 mutual funds. However, 
there are 408 mutual funds that exist in our proprietary dataset but are not covered 
by CRSP Mutual Funds database. The main reason is that CRSP does not cover 
                                                      
5 The labels are slightly different in CRSP. In CRSP, share class is labeled as fund and mutual 




   
 
closed-end funds, such as Aberdeen Emerging Markets Telecommunications and 
Infrastructure Fund (live since 1992) and 40/86 Series Balanced (dead fund). The 
other reason is that although we can find a match in these two datasets, all other 
relevant information over the fund’s history is missing on CRSP. An example is 
AZL AIM Basic Value Fund. We exclude such funds. Conversations with CRSP 
representatives suggest that such missing records seem to be random. In all, we 
believe our merged database remains free of survivorship bias.  
The most salient feature of the combined dataset is that it allows us to analyze 
sub-advisor level performance change, rather than limited to fund level. 
Specifically, since we observe monthly mandate assets for each pair of fund and 
sub-advisor, we are able to estimate monthly performance of a sub-advisor as the 
value weighted average of performance of mutual funds that it sub-advises. Here 
we assume that fund performance gives a proper estimation on how each sub-
advisor is doing with the fund. This assumption definitely holds for single-
subadvised funds and their sub-advisors. But for multi-subadvised funds, our 
assumption may cloud the analysis if there is a remarkable difference in sub-
advisor performances in the same fund and such difference is systematic. To 
address this issue, we further test our hypothesis by using the sample of sub-
advisors served as the single mandate for a fund and compare the results with that 




   
 
Certainly, readers may raise two additional concerns about our estimation. 
First, some sub-advisors may well have in-house businesses and our estimation of 
these sub-advisor performances does not reflect their non-subadvisory businesses. 
This is not a problem because we are interested in knowing the sensitivity of sub-
advisor performance to fund inflows and withdrawals. It is exactly the sub-
advisory business that we want to evaluate. Second, what about a sub-advisor that 
serves funds with different styles (e.g., large growth and small blend) at the same 
time? Given that one of our measurements for mutual fund performance is its 
excess return relative to its Lipper Category, the performance of such sub-advisor 
will then be compared to a hypothetical sub-advisor who has the same portfolio 
allocation and delivers “average” returns.   
A point worth noting is the definition of “date zero” (sub-advisor change date) 
used in this paper. For this, we provide a timeline of sub-advisor change in Figure 
1. Throughout the paper, “date zero” is the effective date of sub-advisor change 
on file, or more accurately, the month end of effective date since we conduct all 
the analyses on a monthly basis. It is true that a decision date (on which a firing 
decision is made) or a “considering” date is more relevant, if the question is “how 
past poor performance is causing a firing decision”. However, this date is 
unobservable. We may assume that in common cases, this date is about two 




   
 
question is “how institutional flows are affecting sub-advisor performance”. This 
is because asset transition usually takes place around the effective date.  
B. Overview of Data 
The definitions and summary statistics of the main variables are reported in 
Table 1. The average age of mutual fund in our sample is 7.8 years. The average 
fund sub-advisor change (expected probability of mutual fund sub-advisor change) 
is 1.06%. Following the standard practice in mutual fund literature, we measure 
the monthly mutual fund flow as the current month net flow of a fund as 
percentage of last month’s total net assets managed by the fund. The monthly 
average flow of mutual funds during the 6 months prior to a sub-advisor change is 
1.01% and the median number is -0.23%. The average monthly mutual fund 
return in excess of its Lipper category 6 months prior to a sub-advisor change is -
0.03% and the median number is -0.01%. The size of mutual funds in our sample 
is positively skewed: the average number is $932.7 million and the median 
number is $189.4 million.   
Table 2 provides an overview of sub-advisor changes. Panel A shows that the 
merged dataset includes 1812 changes in sub-advisor from December 2006 to 
September 2012, among which 1534 are active. The total assets of sub-advisor 




   
 
active changes. Since passive changes are irrelevant for the purpose of our 
analysis, we will focus on active changes only in the rest of the paper. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the number of active sub-advisor changes in each 
year-performance category as a percentage of the number of sub-advised funds in 
that category. For instance, among sub-advised funds with negative past one year 
excess return relative to category in 2007, the number of active changes accounts 
for 13.7%. Notice that the numbers in 2006 and 2012 are much smaller than other 
years, because for 2006 we only have observations in December, and for 2012, we 
only have data from January to September.  
Two patterns are noteworthy. First, the numbers in the left column are larger 
than the numbers in the right column. This suggests that funds with one-year poor 
performance (relative to category) tend to have more sub-advisor changes in the 
subsequent year. Second, the numbers in the right column are more or less stable 
while the numbers in the left column are not; indicating that besides 
underperformance, other reasons could also explain sub-advisor changes.   
Panel C of Table 2 compares the composition of funds that have active sub-
advisor changes and funds that are sub-advised. We classify funds by their 
structure, sub-advisor change type and size respectively. For instance, among 
funds that have active sub-advisor changes, 75.3% (24.7%) are multi-managed 




   
 
are multi-managed (single-managed). An important message from this panel is 
that funds that have active sub-advisor changes are not biased towards a particular 
type of sub-advised funds.  
IV. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverse relation between fund past performance 
and the propensity of a mutual fund changing its sub-advisor, controlling for past 
flows. The inverse relationship should also hold between fund past outflows and 
the propensity of a mutual fund changing its sub-advisor, controlling for past 
performance. 
Our hypothesis is in the spirit of Khorana (1996), who documents that the 
probability of managerial change and the past performance of the fund is 
negatively correlated given internal and external monitoring. Intuitively, this 
relationship is due to the monitoring effects of board of directors. Fund outflows 
could be another factor for board of directors to monitor. Thus, when mutual fund 
performance is worsening, or when mutual funds experience more outflows, the 
probability that the board of directors changes mutual fund sub-advisors should 
increase.    
Hypothesis 2: There are decreasing returns for sub-advisors in deploying 




   
 
This hypothesis follows the seminal paper of Berk and Green (2004), which 
suggests that “there is differential ability to generate high average returns across 
managers, but due to decreasing returns for managers in deploying their superior 
ability, new money flows to the fund to the point at which expected excess returns 
going forward are competitive (page 1271)”. Since mutual funds make their hiring 
and firing decisions based on sub-advisor past information, inefficiency may arise 
when the size of a sub-advisor exceeds it optimal level.   
We develop three implications based on this hypothesis: 
1. A Sub-advisor newly hired by a mutual fund (presumably because it 
performed relatively well before the hiring) gets more assets and delivers less 
attractive returns afterwards. 
2. A Sub-advisor newly fired by a mutual fund (presumably because it 
performed relatively poor before the firing) gets less assets and delivers better 
returns afterwards. 





   
 
V. Empirical Evidence 
A. Hypothesis 1: the effect of performance and flows  
A.1. Overview 
Our first hypothesis is that, when there is deterioration in fund performance or 
a decrease in fund flows, the probability of changing mutual fund sub-advisor 
increases, due to the monitoring effects of mutual fund board of directors. The 
hypothesis implies that as fund performance or fund flow decreases, the 
percentage of funds that have sub-advisor changes should increase accordingly.  
In this section, we show that the percentage of funds with sub-advisor change 
decreases in mutual fund performance and fund flows. We start by calculating 
past 12 month excess return relative to category (RetExCat[-12,-1]) and past 12 
month flow (Flow[-12,-1]) for each fund in each month during the sample period. 
Then we sort them into five quintiles respectively, with 1 being the bottom 
quintile and 5 being the top quintile. For each pair of return and flow quintile, we 
calculate the number of funds that have sub-advisor changes as a percentage of 
the total number of funds in each month.  Table 3 presents the percentage of 
mutual funds with sub-advisor change averaged across all the months for each 
pair of return and flow quintile. The 5-1 differences in the numbers are tested and 




   
 
Table 3 shows that when past 12 month flow quintile of mutual funds is 
controlled, the percentage of mutual funds changing sub-advisors decreases as 
past 12 month return quintile increases. For instance, for mutual funds in the 
bottom flow quintile (funds that experience most outflows), 1.66% have sub-
advisor changes if they are in the bottom performance quintile and only 0.86% 
have sub-advisor changes if they are in the top performance quintile. The 5-1 
differences are significant at less than 5% level for all flow quintiles. When past 
12 month return quintile is controlled, the percentage of mutual funds with sub-
advisor changes decreases in flow quintile. But the 5-1 differences are only 
significant when returns are in the 1st, 2nd and 4th quintiles. The evidence suggests 
that when mutual fund past performance is mediocre or very good compared to its 
category, the likelihood of a fund changing its sub-advisor does not seem to vary 
much with whether the fund experience inflows or outflows. 
A.2. Semiparametric Analysis 
In this subsection, we show that the relation between the probability of 
changing a sub-advisor and fund past performance is somewhat linear. We use a 
semiparametric approach, in which the relation between the probability of a sub-
advisor change and performance is not restricted to be linear, to provide a 




   
 
important as the relation between change and performance might be nonlinear, 
similar to the widely documented nonlinearity in flow-performance sensitivity.  
Figure 2 shows the results of the semiparametric analysis. In the figure, the 
vertical axis is the probability of a mutual fund changing a sub-advisor in month t 
(ܲሺܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ൌ 1ሻ) and the horizontal axis is the fund’s past return performance, 
measured by the monthly excess return relative to benchmark averaged over 
months t-6 to t-1 (ܴ݁ݐܧݔܥܽݐ୧,ሾ୲ି଺,୲ିଵሿ).  
Figure 2 plots the change-to-performance sensitivity as estimated by the 
following equations: 
 ܲ൫ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ൌ 1| ௜ܺ,௧൯ ൌ expሼ݂ሺ ௜ܺ,௧ሻሽ1 ൅ expሼ݂ሺ ௜ܺ,௧ሻሽ (1) 
 ݂൫ ௜ܺ,௧൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴ݁ݐܧݔܥܽݐ௜,ሾ௧ି଺,௧ିଵሿሻ ൅ ߚܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (2) 
Note that in Equation (2) we have a semiparametric specification and Control 
is a vector of control variables that include fund size (Size, in log million dollars), 
fund age (Age, years since inception, in logs) and past flows (ܨ݈݋ݓ୧,ሾ୲ି୩,୲ି୩ିହሿ). 
The estimation of Equation (2) applies the method introduced by Robinson (1988) 
and used by Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) in 




   
 
The solid line in Figure 2 represents the plot of ܲ൫ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ൌ 1| ௜ܺ,௧൯ and the 
corresponding dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. Figure 2 
shows that there is a quite good linear relationship between the probability of 
changing a sub-advisor and past performance. Meanwhile, even for funds that 
outperform their peers by 2% per month, the probability of changing a sub-
advisor is somewhere between 0.60% and 0.72%, indicating that 
(under)performance is not the only factor that affects sub-advisor change. In the 
next subsection, we move to a regression analysis that allows us to conduct proper 
tests of statistical significance. 
A.3. Regression Analysis 
A.3.1. Effect of Performance 
For a summary estimate of the effect of mutual fund past performance on 
changes in sub-advisors, we conduct the following probit regression at the fund-
month level and report the results in Table 4: 












   
 
In Equation (3), Change equals one if there is a sub-advisor change in mutual 
fund, and zero otherwise. ܴ݁ݐܧݔܥܽݐ௜,ሾ௧ଵ,௧ଶሿ is the monthly average excess return 
relative to category of the mutual fund during ሾݐ1, ݐ2ሿ period. ܲ݋݋ݎ௜,ሾ௧ଵ,௧ଶሿ equals 
one if ܴ݁ݐܧݔܥܽݐ௜,ሾ௧ଵ,௧ଶሿ  is negative and zero otherwise. The coefficient of 
ܲ݋݋ݎ௜,ሾ௧ଵ,௧ଶሿ captures the difference in the probability of changing a sub-advisor, 
when mutual fund past performance changes from slightly positive to slightly 
negative. The interaction term of ܴ݁ݐܧݔܥܽݐ௜,ሾ௧ଵ,௧ଶሿ  and ܲ݋݋ݎ௜,ሾ௧ଵ,௧ଶሿ  enters the 
model to test whether poorly performed funds have a different sensitivity of sub-
advisor change to performance. Control variables (Control) include fund past 
flows (Flow[t-k-5,t-k]), an indicator of whether past flows are negative (Out[t-k-
5,t-k]), the interaction of the two, as well as size of the fund in log million dollars 
(Size) and fund age in log years (Age). We also include time dummies in the 
regression to control for the variation over time in sub-advisor changes. Hence, if 
there is a special time that mutual funds tend to change their sub-advisors together, 
it will be captured by the time dummies. To compute the standard errors, we 
assume that the residuals are independent across different funds, but allow for 
correlation over time within a fund.  
The evidence confirms our hypothesis: there is an inverse relation between 
fund performance in the past 2 years and the probability of changing a sub-




   
 
quite good linearity, i.e., the change-to-performance sensitivities are quite similar 
in the positive performance region (RetExCat>0) and negative performance 
region (RetExCat<0).   
Given that we estimate the effect in a probit regression, one needs to calculate 
the marginal effect of an explanatory variable on Pr(Y=1). For instance, to 
measure how one standard deviation decrease in RetExCat[-6,-1] (excess return 
during the previous 6 months) from its mean affects the likelihood of sub-advisor 
change, we can first compute Pr(Y=1)=Φ(Xβ) with all independent variables 
evaluated at their means. Then we re-compute Pr(Y=1)=Φ(X*β), with RetExCat[-
6,-1] evaluated at its mean minus standard deviation, and all other variables 
evaluated at their means. The difference in the two probabilities is the impact of a 
standard deviation decrease in RetExCat[-6,-1] from its mean when all other 
independent variables are held at their means. 
The regression coefficients imply that, when RetExCat[-6,-1] decreases by 
one standard deviation from its mean of -0.03% to -0.81%, the probability of 
triggering a sub-advisor change increases by 33% (from 0.98% to 1.30%). This 
result is consistent with the evidence in Table 3.     
Another interesting finding is the effect of fund size (Size) on the probability 
of changing a sub-advisor. Presumably, fund size could have effects that offset 




   
 
might be more structured and maintains a long-term relationship with its sub-
advisor; therefore, it is less likely to change its sub-advisor. On the other hand, a 
large fund might be more aggressive in sub-advisor changes because it has more 
resources.  
The regression estimate suggests that, when fund size increases one standard 
deviation from its mean, the probability of changing a sub-advisor increases by 13% 
(from 1.05% to 1.19%) and is significant. The result indicates that generally 
speaking, a large fund tends to be more aggressive in changing a sub-advisor.  
A.3.2. Effect of Flows 
Following the previous section, we controll for fund past performances and 
estimate of the effect of mutual fund past flows on changes in sub-advisors. We 
use the following probit regression at the fund -month level and report the results 
in Table 5: 







∙ Out୧,ሾ୲ି୩ିହ,୲ି୩ሿሻ ൅ Control୧,୲ ൅ ε௜,୲ (4)
In this equation, ܨ݈݋ݓ௜,ሾ௧ଵ,௧ଶሿ is the monthly average flow to the mutual fund 
during [t1,t2] period and that ܱݑݐ௜,ሾ௧ଵ,௧ଶሿ is an indicator of fund outflows, which 




   
 
(Control) include fund past performance (RetExCat[t-k-5, t-k]), an indicator of 
whether the past performance is negative (Poor[t-k-5, t-k]), the interaction term, 
as well as fund size (Size) and fund age (Age). We also include time dummies in 
the regression to control for the variation over time in sub-advisor changes. To 
compute the standard errors, we assume that the residuals are independent across 
different funds, but allow for correlation over time within a fund. 
Table 5 suggests that there is an inverse relation between fund past 6 month 
flow when flow is negative and the probability of changing a sub-advisor (-1.66 to 
-1.82). In other words, sub-advisors are more likely to be replaced if there is 
increasing outflows in the mutual fund. This can be attributed to the monitoring 
effect of board of directors in mutual funds. For example, if board of directors 
finds that the asset class or investment strategy that the sub-advisor specializes in 
starts to lose attractiveness among investors, it will tend to replace the sub-advisor. 
When flow is positive, the inverse relation is not significant. This indicates that 
the sensitivity of sub-advisor change to fund flow is convex. However, the inverse 
relation is insignificant when we consider longer term fund flows. Since the 
estimates for control variables are similar to those reported in Table 4, we do not 
report them here for the sake of space.  
We now quantify the marginal effect of fund past 6 month flow on the 




   
 
one standard deviation from its mean of 1.01% to -5.31%, the probability of 
changing a sub-advisor increases by 14% (from 0.94% to 1.07%). Recall that the 
probability of sub-advisor change increases by 33% when performance decrease 
by one standard deviation from its mean, this result shows that the effect of flow 
on sub-advisor change is relatively smaller compared to the effect of performance. 
A.3.3. Effect of Interaction of Performance and Flows 
It could be possible that when performance and flows interact with each other, 
the effect on sub-advisor change becomes different and thus clouds our analysis 
on the effect of performance or flows on sub-advisor change. We estimate the 
following model and test this possibility in Table 6.  







∙ Flow୧,ሾ୲ି୩ିହ,୲ି୩ሿሻ ൅ Control୧,୲ ൅ ε୧,୲ (5)
In all estimations, the coefficients on the interaction term of past excess 
returns and flows are insignificant. The results suggest that the effect of past 
performance on sub-advisor change does not change in past flows. By the same 
token, the effect of past flows on sub-advisor change does not change in past 
performance. The table also confirms our previous finding that past fund 




   
 
A.4. Investor Unawareness 
In this section, we test investor awareness of sub-advisor changes. Since a 
mutual fund can hire or fire sub-advisors without a shareholder vote in most cases, 
the common view is that investors are unaware of sub-advisor changes. If this 
holds, fund flows should not respond to changes in sub-advisor. We test this 
prediction in the following regression at the fund-month level and present the 
results in Table 7: 
 Flow୧,୲ ൌ α ൅ βChange୧,୲ ൅ γControl୧,୲ ൅ ε௜,୲ (6)
In the equation, ܨ݈݋ݓ௜,௧ is mutual fund flow, ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ is a dummy variable 
that equals one if there is a sub-advisor change in the fund and zero otherwise. We 
use contemporaneous observations of the two variables because when sub-advisor 
changes take place, such information is immediately disclosed and is available to 
be viewed on the SEC website.       
Control variables (Control) include average fund flow during the past 1 to 6 
months (Flow[-6,-1]), average fund flow during the past 7 to 12 months (Flow[-
12,-7]), average excess return during the past 1 to 6 months (RetExCat[-6,-1]), 
average excess return during the past 7 to 12 months (RetExCat[-12,-7]), fund 
size in log million dollars (Size), fund age in log years (Age) and fund expense 




   
 
because these variables are associated with sub-advisor changes, as shown in the 
previous section. We also control for fund expense ratio because presumably, an 
increase in expense ratio predicts a decrease in fund flows. We include time 
dummies in the regression to control for the variation over time in flows. To 
compute the standard errors, we assume that the residuals are independent across 
different funds, but allow for correlation over time within a fund. 
Table 7 presents the results for all funds (equity funds, fixed income funds and 
mix, etc.) and for equity funds only. With all observations being included, 
Column (1) and (4) show that the sensitivity of flow to change in sub-advisor, 
captured by the coefficient of Change, is insignificant. This indicates that fund 
flows do not seem to respond to sub-advisor changes. 
We now distinguish two possible rationales consistent with the previous 
findings. One potential rationale is that investors are unaware of a sub-advisor 
change; the other is that investors are actually aware of a sub-advisor change but 
simply decide not to respond to it. We argue that should investors be aware of a 
sub-advisor change, they are unlikely not to respond to it if the fund has been 
underperforming for a relatively long term. In other words, if investors do not to 
react to a sub-advisor change when fund past performance is poor, it’s very likely 




   
 
To test this, we estimate the regression coefficients using a sub-sample of 
negative average excess returns during the past 6 months (RetExCat[-6,-1]<0), 
and a sub-sample of negative average excess returns during the past two 
consecutive half years (RetExCat[-6,-1]<0 & RetExCat[-12,-7]<0)). In Table 7, 
the results in Column (2), (3), (5) and (6) (obtained for the sub-samples of 
negative past performance) are very similar to those in Column (1) and (4) 
(obtained for the whole samples). This shows that even investors of poorly 
performed funds do not respond to a sub-advisor change, indicating that investor 
are probably unaware of it.  
B. Hypothesis 2: Decreasing Return of Sub-Advisors 
So far, we analyze the factors that affect the probability of having an active 
sub-advisor change for mutual funds. Are these changes effective ex-post? Berk 
and Green (2004) suggest that there are decreasing returns for managers in 
deploying their superior ability. If this hypothesis holds for sub-advisors, mutual 
funds may well remain to underperform their peers. We test the hypothesis and its 
implications in this section. 
B.1. Overview 
If there are decreasing returns for sub-advisors in deploying their superior 
ability, new money flows to a sub-advisor to the point at which expected excess 




   
 
advisor past information, they hire sub-advisors that are past winners and fire 
those that are past losers.  Inefficiency may arise when the size of a sub-advisor 
exceeds it optimal capacity.   
Figure 3 presents the monthly average excess return of sub-advisors relative to 
their perspective categories around the hiring. Consistent with Prediction 1, the 
figure shows that sub-advisor excess return tends to decrease after it is hired by a 
mutual fund.  
Figure 4 presents the monthly average excess return of sub-advisors relative to 
their perspective categories around the firing. The figure shows that before a sub-
advisor is fired, its monthly excess return is negative and significant. The 
performance of the sub-advisor, however, improves after the firing. The evidence 
is consistent with Prediction 2.  
Table 8 quantifies sub-advisor cumulative excess return around the hiring and 
firing events. Column (1) shows that when sub-advisor category is controlled, a 
newly hired sub-advisor significantly underperforms its category by 0.98% in the 
following 18 months after being hired. Before the hiring decision is made, the 
performance of the sub-advisor is comparative to its peers. Column (3) shows that 
a newly fired sub-advisor performed relatively well compared to its Lipper 
category in the following 18 months after being fired. This newly fired sub-




   
 
decision is made. Column (2) and (4) show that, when sub-advisor category, past 
performance and flows are all controlled, a sub-advisor significantly 
underperforms its peers by 0.45% in the following 18 months after being hired, a 
sub-advisor performs relatively well with its peers in the following 18 months 
after being fired. We argue that the improvement in performance of fired sub-
advisor is unlikely driven by mean reversion because Column (4) essentially 
serves as a placebo test. 
B.2. Regression Analysis 
In this section, we directly test Hypothesis 2: there are decreasing returns for 
sub-advisors in deploying their superior abilities. For each sub-advisor, we 
calculate two measures to capture its size: the mandate assets in million dollars 
(Assets), and the mandate number of funds (Counts).  
We test the hypothesis in the following model: 
 RetExCat୨,୲ ൌ α ൅ βSize୨,୲ିଵ ൅ Control୨,୲ ൅ ε୨,୲ (7)
In the equation, control variables (Control) include sub-advisor return in 
excess of the category in the end of last month (RetExCat(-1)), the value weighted 
Affiliation score a sub-advisor gets from all of its mandated mutual funds 
(Affiliation), the value weighted Index score a sub-advisor gets from all of its 




   
 
from all of its mandated mutual funds (FOF), and the value weighted Equity score 
a sub-advisor gets from all of its mandated mutual funds (Equity). These variables 
(except for RetExCat(-1)) are sub-advisor characteristics that could potentially 
affect performance. All estimations include sub-advisor fixed effects.  Standard 
errors adjust for heteroskedasticity. In Column (1) and (3), we include sub-advisor 
fixed effects to control for the unobserved heterogeneity across sub-advisors. In 
Column (2) and (4), we include both sub-advisor fixed effects and time effects so 
that we control for both the unobserved heterogeneity across sub-advisors as well 
as unexpected variation or special events (such as financial crisis) that may affect 
returns.   
Our main prediction is that the sign of β should be negative. Table 9 presents 
results that are consistent with this prediction using two size measures, mandated 
assets and mandated counts respectively. Column (1) shows that, for a given sub-
advisor, as its mandated assets increase across time by $2.7 million (so that the 
natural logarithm of the sub-advisor assets increases by $1 million), the sub-
advisor excess return relative to its category decreases by 0.84% per year (-
0.07%*12), controlling for other characteristics. The estimation is significant at 
less than 1% level. Column (3) shows that, for a given sub-advisor, as its 
mandated counts increases by 2.7 units (so that the natural logarithm of the sub-




   
 
category decreases by 1.00% per year (-0.083%*12) and is significant at less than 
1% level. In all estimations, sub-advisor past performance positively predicts its 
current performance and the coefficients are significant at less than 1% level. This 
is consistent with empirical findings in the mutual fund literature (see e.g., Chen, 
Goldstein and Jiang (2010)). 
Table 10 replicates analyses from Table 9 on subsamples of equity sub-
advisors. The effect of size on sub-advisor performance is stronger for equity sub-
advisors. Specifically, for a given sub-advisor, as its mandated assets increase 
across time by $2.7 million, the sub-advisor excess return relative to its category 
decreases by 1.08% per year (-0.09%*12), controlling for other characteristics. 
The estimation is significant at less than 1% level. As its mandated counts 
increases by 2.7 units, the sub-advisor excess return relative to its category 
decreases by 1.44% per year (-0.12%*12) and is again significant at less than 1% 
level.  
B.3. Implication on Mutual Fund Performance 
So far we analyze decreasing returns for sub-advisors in deploying their 
ability. The results show that for a given sub-advisor, its excess return decreases 
in its mandate assets or counts. How does this phenomenon affect the 




   
 
Figure 5 Panel A plots mutual fund average excess return by time around an 
active sub-advisor change. The figure shows that mutual fund excess return 
relatively to its category seems to slightly increase after an active sub-advisor 
change. We test the significance in Table 11 and 12.  
Table 11 presents the cumulative average return and the cumulative average 
expense ratio of mutual funds with a sub-advisor change (targets) in excess of the 
benchmarks, around the effective change date denoted as “date zero”. We 
calculate three benchmarks. Benchmark 1 in Column (1) and (4) is all funds in the 
same Lipper category as the target on “date zero”. Benchmark 2 in Column (2) 
and (5) is all sub-advised funds in the same Lipper category as the target on “date 
zero”. Benchmark 3 in Column (3) and (6) is all funds in the same Lipper 
category and in the same past return quintile as the target on “date zero”. For a 
detailed explanation of the calculation, please see Table 11. All standard errors 
adjust for cross-correlation and auto-correlation. 
The most interesting finding in Table 11 is that mutual funds continue to 
significantly underperform their benchmarks by 0.60% to 0.93% in the 18-months 
after a sub-advisor change, depending on the benchmark measure. In particular, 
even when we control for last year's fund return and the fund category, mutual 
funds continue to significantly underperform by 0.93% in the following 18 




   
 
by a mutual fund, sub-advisor performance decreases. The table also shows that 
before a sub-advisor change, mutual funds significantly underperform their 
benchmarks by 0.58% to 2.07%, depending on the benchmark measure. This 
result is not surprising since mutual funds that change their sub-advisors are likely 
to be poorly performing ones, as suggested in Table 3 and 4. Meanwhile, Column 
(4) to (6) suggest that mutual funds with sub-advisor change have higher expense 
ratio compared to their benchmarks and the magnitude is quite persistent over 
time.   
Now we try to test whether the continued underperformance of mutual funds 
experiencing a sub-advisor change results from continued outflows from clients. 
Results in Coval and Stafford (2007) suggest that large outflows can cause poor 
fund performance because funds are forced to sell their stocks to meet client 
redemptions, putting downward pressure on prices. Evidence in Tables 3 and 5 
suggests that outflows predict sub-advisor changes, but it's also likely that 
outflows continue even after the sub-advisor is changed because outflows are 
persistent. If so, the later outflows could help explain the underperformance after 
a sub-advisor change. We test this by controlling for past flow quintiles, in 
addition to fund category and past return quintiles. 
In Table 12, Column (1) control for fund past 12 month flows, in addition to 




   
 
month flows, in addition to fund category and past 6 month returns. Column (3) 
control for fund past 1 month flows, in addition to fund category and past 1 month 
returns. All standard errors adjust for cross-correlation and auto-correlation. 
The table shows that sub-advised mutual funds continue to significantly 
underperform by about 0.8% to 1.0% in the 18-months after a change in sub-
advisor, even when we control for last year’s fund flows, fund returns and fund 
category. Thus, we believe that the continuing underperformance of mutual funds 
with sub-advisor change is unlikely to be resulted from continuing outflows from 
clients. Rather, it is reasonable for us to believe that the underperformance of 
mutual funds can be attributed to decreasing returns for sub-advisors in deploying 
their ability. The table also suggests that for mutual funds with sub-advisor 
changes, their performance is not improved in the 18 months following the 
change, compared to the performance in the 18 months before the change. These 
funds, however, have 0.28% (0.14%*2) higher expense ratios per year, compared 
to their benchmarks.   
VI. Conclusion 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of mutual funds and their sub-
advisors around the event of a sub-advisor change. We test two hypotheses. First, 
there is an inverse relation between mutual fund past performance and the 




   
 
mutual fund past outflows and the probability of changing a sub-advisor. This is 
because of the monitoring effects of mutual fund board of directors. Second, there 
are decreasing returns for sub-advisors in deploying their ability. We present 
evidence that is consistent with these views. 
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, our paper sheds new light on 
the factors that affect mutual fund decisions in sub-advisor change. We find that 
in addition to fund performance, fund outflows and fund size affect the propensity 
of mutual funds changing their sub-advisors. Second, our paper is the first in the 
literature to provide evidence on decreasing returns for money managers in 
deploying their ability in the context of sub-advisors. While previous literature 
provides analysis from the perspective of mutual funds and hedge funds, data 
used in our paper allows us to address this issue from the perspective of sub-
advisors. We show that after being hired by a mutual fund, the size of the sub-
advisor increases and its subsequent performance decreases. Third, our paper 
shows that although mutual funds make rational decisions in changing a sub-
advisor, their performance is not improved due to decreasing returns for sub-





   
 
Hedge Fund Equity Holdings in the Real Estate Boom and Bust 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the exposure of hedge funds to 
overpriced real estate assets. First, I show that the Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs) were overpriced from 2003Q1 to 2007Q2. Second, using a 
comprehensive sample of 434 hedge funds, I find that these funds were holding 
RETIs instead of selling short during the overpriced period, consistent with 
models in which delegated portfolio managers may want to invest in overpriced 
assets.  
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I. Introduction 
Hedge fund managers are sometimes faced with a dilemma: whether to invest 
in overpriced assets or not. Holding overpriced assets could be disastrous if prices 
start to fall. At the same time, selling short could result in losses if managers are 
forced to close out positions if prices keep rising. Avoiding the market could also 
be risky if fund managers’ returns are not competitive. For instance, John 
Paulson, the hedge fund manager who started to trade against the housing market 
in mid-2006, endured one of the most difficult periods in his life in the latter half 
of 2006 as housing prices continued to rise. Yet he managed to fend off 
skepticism and hostility from investors and meet their redemptions. He finally 
made $15 billion for his firm in 20076. 
How managers make choices when faced with this dilemma is not well 
studied since data on hedge funds is difficult to obtain. This paper investigates 
their behavior. Specifically, I ask whether hedge funds were holding or short 
selling overpriced real estate stocks.   
Before addressing these questions, a critical question is whether and when the 
real estate sector was overpriced. Although there were differing views in 
academia and in the public media before the financial crisis, this paper provides 
evidence on real estate overpricing using information before the market collapsed. 
                                                      




   
 
Following Ofek and Richardson (2002), I find that, at the peak, the Real Estate 
Investment Trust (REIT) sector that consisted of 268 stocks, was priced as if the 
average future earnings growth rate across all these entities would exceed the 
growth rates experienced by some of the fastest growing individual firms in the 
past, and meanwhile, the required rate of return would be zero for the next five 
years. Other valuations also suggest that REITs were overpriced beginning in 
2003. 
Having documented the overpricing in real estate, I analyze hedge fund 
reactions using a comprehensive sample of 434 hedge funds. The data cover the 
period 2003Q1 to 2009Q1 and are compiled from various sources. Specifically, I 
start by estimating the exposure of hedge funds to REITs based on the long 
positions reported in their 13F filings. I find that the proportion of hedge funds’ 
overall stock holdings devoted to REITs was higher than the corresponding 
weight of REITs in the market portfolio during the overpricing period from 
2003Q1 to 2007Q2. 
To test how potential short positions affect this analysis, I regress returns on 
various aggregate hedge fund indexes on the market return and the real estate 
excess return. I find that for most aggregate hedge fund returns, loadings on the 
real estate sector were not significant. The insignificance indicates that hedge 




   
 
Moreover, dynamic analysis that allows for time-varying regression coefficients 
also supports this result. To conclude, hedge funds were holding real estate stocks 
rather than selling short during the overpricing period. 
The above empirical finding is consistent with two main insights in the 
literature on limits of arbitrage. First, professional investors may be reluctant to 
trade aggressively against mispricing. In DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldman (1990a), an arbitrageur with a short time horizon will limit her 
willingness to trade against mispricing because of “noise trader risk”, which is the 
risk of a further change in the opinion of noise traders away from its mean. Abreu 
and Brunnermeier (2002) show that a rational trader may delay an arbitrage trade 
because of synchronization risk, which is the uncertainty about the timing of other 
arbitrageurs’ actions, and her desire to minimize holding costs. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) argue that delegated portfolio managers can become most 
constrained when they have the best opportunities (i.e., when mispricing widens). 
The fear of forced redemption would stop them from trading aggressively to 
eradicate mispricing. Consistent with this view, Sirri and Tufano (1998), 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) find that 
mutual funds experience outflows when their performance is poor. Others 




   
 
Ingersoll, and Ross (2003); Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2004); Baquero and 
Verbeek (2005); Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2009). 
Second, under certain circumstances, rational investors may find it optimal to 
invest in overpriced assets. In DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990b), 
rational investors will buy overpriced assets and raise prices. This is because 
positive feedback investors, who buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall, 
are expected to react to today’s price rise by buying, which will raise prices even 
further. In Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), arbitrageurs will invest in overpriced 
assets if they believe their peers are unlikely to trade against them yet. 
Arbitrageurs will sell those assets only when their subjective probability that the 
bubble will burst is sufficiently high. In all, my findings are consistent with these 
theoretical results. 
The empirical finding in this paper is also consistent with Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2004). In their seminal paper, the authors find that hedge funds were 
heavily invested in technology stocks from 1998 to 2000 and gained from this 
strategy. Furthermore, they find that different exposures to the technology 
segment during the overpricing period coincided with quite different flow 





   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I outline the 
hypothesis and discuss the underlying premise. Section III describes the data 
collection process and presents the summary statistics. In Section IV, I define the 
overpriced sector and provide evidence on overpricing. In Section V, I test my 
hypothesis. Finally, Section VI concludes. 
II. Hypothesis 
Hedge funds are holding overpriced assets before the market collapses.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that trading against mispricing is risky 
because mispricing may deepen in the short run, even though there is no long run 
fundamental risk in the trade. Since fund flows are sensitive to past performance, 
the fear of forced redemption would stop delegated portfolio managers from 
trading aggressively to eradicate mispricing.  
Furthermore, managers may have incentive to invest in overpriced assets if 
they believe they can predict other investors’ behavior. DeLong, Shleifer, 
Summers and Waldman (1990b) show that in anticipation of the demand from 
positive feedback investors who chase the price trend, rational investors will buy 
today and drive prices up because positive feedback investors are expected to buy 
tomorrow and raise future prices even further. In Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), 




   
 
their peers will trade against overpricing is low. They will only sell or short the 
overpriced assets when their subjective probability that the bubble will burst is 
sufficiently high. In both models, rational investors believe that they can get out 
of the market before it collapses. 
In this section, I present the hypothesis that is analyzed in this paper. To 
conduct my study, I compile several data sources since virtually no single dataset 
is eligible to test the hypothesis. In the next section, I discuss the data collection 
process and present the summary statistics. 
III. Data Description 
In subsection 1, I discuss the data collection process and describe how each 
dataset serves my analysis. In subsection 2, I provide an overview of hedge fund 
stock holdings. 
A. Collection of the Data 
My first dataset is comprised of monthly stock prices, shares outstanding, and 
share codes that are obtained from CRSP. The sample ranges from January 1998 
to March 2009 so that both the technology overpricing and the real estate 
overpricing, and their consequent collapsing periods are covered. I then link this 




   
 
COMPUSTAT (Both CRSP and COMPUSTAT are available through WRDS). I 
use this combined dataset to provide evidence on overpricing. 
The second dataset includes quarterly institutional holdings from 1998Q1 to 
2009Q1 from the Thomson Reuters Ownership Database (formerly known as the 
CDA/Spectrum database). The holdings are based on institutional 13F filings with 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and are available through 
WRDS. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act7, a 1978 amendment to the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 required all institutional investment managers that exercise 
investment discretion over $100 million or more in securities to file Form 13F to 
the SEC. Such securities include common stock, put/call option, class A shares, 
and certain convertible debentures. However, the Thomson Reuters Ownership 
Database only reports institutional stock holdings. Holdings are reported quarterly 
with a maximum of 45-day delay, where all common-stock positions greater than 
10,000 shares or $200,000 must be disclosed. I merge this dataset with the third 
one to study hedge fund investment strategies. 
The third dataset consists of a list of hedge funds8. Although the term “hedge 
fund” is not statutorily defined, it refers generally to any pooled investment 
                                                      
7 On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that advisers to hedge funds and other private 
funds with assets under managing of more than $150 million register with the SEC. This change in 
criterion does not affect my analysis since my sample period ends in 2009. 
 




   
 
vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional money managers, 
and not widely available to the public9. In practice, Agarwal, Fos and Jiang (2010) 
classify an institution that files a 13F as a hedge fund company if it satisfies one 
of the following: “ (i) It matches the name of one or multiple funds from the 
Union Hedge Fund Database which includes CISDM, Eureka, HFR, MSCI, and 
TASS. (ii) It is listed by industry publications (Hedge Fund Group (HFG), 
Barron’s, Alpha Magazine, and Institutional Investors) as one of the top hedge 
funds. (iii) The company’s own website claims itself as a hedge fund management 
company or lists hedge fund management as a major line of business. (iv) The 
company is featured by news articles in Factiva as a hedge fund manager/sponsor. 
(v) Some 13F filer names are those of individuals, for example, Soros Fund 
Management.” The list consists of relatively “pure-play” hedge funds, since full-
service banks that engage in hedge fund business (such as Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management and UBS Dillon Read), fund management companies that enter both 
the mutual fund (or sub-advisors of mutual fund) and hedge fund business are 
excluded from the list. The reason for exclusion is that 13F holdings of these full 
service companies may not be informative of their hedge fund business. 
The last database consists of a variety of monthly hedge fund indices available 
from the Hedge Fund Research (HFR). Each index reflects the aggregate 
                                                                                                                                                    
 





   
 
historical performance of a group of hedge funds with the same investment style. 
These indices are net of fees and rebalanced quarterly. For a hedge fund to be 
included in the index, a minimum asset size of $50 million and 24-month track 
record are required. I back out hedge fund net investments in the real estate sector 
from these indices. 
B. Summary Statistics 
Definitions of the main variables are reported in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of hedge funds quarterly holdings in 
the sample of real estate overpricing. Column (3) suggests that the fast growth in 
the number of managers with a valid 13F filing from 2003Q1 to 2007Q1 
coincides with the stock market boom. Column (5) shows that the median number 
of stocks per manager is around 90, indicating that hedge fund holdings were 
concentrated to a certain extent. In the paper, I use the total stock holdings of the 
fund as a proxy for hedge fund size. Column (7) and Column (8) show that the 
sizes of hedge funds in my sample are positively skewed, i.e., a few hedge funds 
are much larger than the majority of funds. Column (13) reveals that the aggregate 
size of all the hedge funds in my sample increased sharply until 2007 and slumped 




   
 
[Insert Table 2] 
Column (10) to (12) report the annual portfolio turnover that measures hedge 
funds’ trading unrelated to flows. Following Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers 
(2000), quarterly portfolio turnover is denoted as the minimum of the absolute 
values of buys and sells of a manager over the quarter scaled by the last quarter 
end total holdings. Then, the quarterly turnover is multiplied by four so that it is 
annualized and comparable to the literature. The annual (quarterly) portfolio 
turnover in my sample is around 100% (25%), consistent with Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2004). This relatively small number indicates that a substantial part of 
hedge funds’ holdings survives from one quarter to the next, and it is exactly this 
low frequency part that is relevant — I am interested in the long-term overall 
allocation to the real estate sector rather than the high frequency trades. 
In this section, I describe the data collection process and present summary 
statistics on hedge funds holdings. Before analyzing the data, a critical question is 
whether and when the real estate sector was overpriced. In the next section, I 
address this issue. 
IV. Evidence on Overpricing 
In this section, I provide evidence on real estate overpricing using information 




   
 
analysis, my conjecture is that hedge fund managers were aware of the 
overpricing. The following section is organized as follows. In subsection 1, I 
present controversial views on whether the real estate sector was overpriced. In 
subsection 2, I examine the Real Estate Investment Trusts and provide evidence 
on overpricing. 
A. Controversial Views 
There were differing views on whether the real estate sector was overpriced 
before the market started to collapse in 2007. On one hand, Himmelberg, Mayer, 
and Sinai (2005) argue that it was impossible to state definitively whether or not a 
housing bubble existed. They find that most housing markets did not look much 
more expensive in 2004 than they had looked over the previous 10 years, and in 
most major cities their valuation measures were nowhere near their historic highs. 
On the other hand, there was a popular perception of overpricing in the U.S. 
housing market as early as in the year of 2002. For instance, articles in the 
Economist repeatedly warned of overpricing not only in the U.S. but also in the 
U.K. and other countries. From 2002 to 2003, the Economist published a series of 
articles with titles like “Bubble Trouble” (05/16/2002), “Betting the House” 
(03/06/2003), “Castles in Hot Air” (05/29/2003), and “House of Cards” 
(05/29/2003). Baker (2002) identifies the bubble and argues that the increase in 




   
 
house price datasets produced by the US government. Case and Shiller (2003) 
conclude that the general indicators of the defining characteristics of bubbles were 
fairly strong in 2003 by looking at survey data. Robert Shiller further emphasized 
this point in February 2005 in his best-selling book Irrational Exuberance, by 
showing that the U.S. residential real estate prices rose by 52% between 1997 and 
2004, or 6.2% per year, while the prices rose by only 66% between 1890 and 
2004, or by just 0.4% a year. In addition, some expressed their doubts on housing 
privately. In mid-2004, David Andrukonis, the then Chief Risk Officer of Freddie 
Mac, warned Richard F. Syron, the then CEO that Freddie Mac was financing 
risk-laden loans that threatened its financial stability. However, Syron simply 
decided to ignore the warnings10. 
B. Evidence from REITs 
A real estate investment trust is a company that owns and typically operates 
income producing real estate or real estate-related assets. An entity that qualifies 
as a REIT can avoid most entity-level federal tax by complying with detailed 
restrictions on its ownership structure and operations11. An important restriction is 
that a REIT must distribute at least 90 percent of its taxable income to 
shareholders annually in the form of dividends. Hence, to fund the growth of its 
business, a REIT usually relies heavily on external financing, i.e., shareholder 
                                                      
10 Read more details at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/business/05freddie.html  
 




   
 
equity capital or debt borrowed from other lenders (see discussion in Wu and 
Riddiough, 2005). 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are usually considered as the closest 
substitute for real estate business in the stock market. With the fast growth in the 
real estate market, the MSCI U.S. REITs Index more than tripled from early 2003 
onwards till early 2007; during the same time, the S&P 500 Index increased only 
about 80% (see Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 1] 
To evaluate the individual real estate stocks, I identify 268 REITs that are 
publicly traded in the U.S. stock market12. As a first check, I compare the median 
Enterprise Value to EBITDA (EV/EBITDA) ratios of the REITs sector with 
NYSE stocks13. Enterprise Value is denoted as a firm’s market capital plus debt 
minus cash and equivalent. EBITDA is equivalent to earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization. Like the Price to Earnings (P/E) ratio, 
EV/EBITDA ratio is a valuation multiple that measures the value of a firm; 
however, the latter is more appropriate for valuations of REITs and comparisons 
                                                      
12 A stock is classified as a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) if its share code is 18 on CRSP. I 
provide the list of 268 REITs in Appendix. 
 
13 I use median instead of mean so that my results are not driven by outliers. The results look 
similar when I aggregate the Enterprise Value and EBITDA for each sector and take the ratios. 





   
 
across companies. The reason is twofold. First, different from most fixed-plant or 
equipment investment, real estate rarely loses value. Therefore, EBITDA is a 
superior gauge of REITs’ performance since it excludes depreciation. Second, P/E 
ratio fails to consider various levels of leverage across the companies, while 
EV/EBITDA ratio maintains capital structure neutrality. Hence, for each stock, I 
calculate its enterprise value and relate it to EBITDA that is lagged at least six 
months, following the accounting convention. 
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the median EV/EBITDA ratios of REITs 
and NYSE stocks from January 2000 to March 2009. Two observations 
immediately follow. First, the EV/EBITDA ratio of REITs increased dramatically 
from 13 to 32 during early 2002 and early 2007, followed by substantial declines 
thereafter. Second, this extraordinary rise in EV/EBITDA ratio is not pervasive 
among the NYSE stocks. In fact, the median EV/EBITDA ratio of the NYSE 
stocks was around 10 before 2007. Hence, the substantial increase in 
EV/EBITDA ratio before early 2007 and the subsequent decrease was largely 
confined to the real estate sector. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
To formalize the analysis, I follow Ofek and Richardson (2002) that built on 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) model for stock valuation. I show that despite the 




   
 
their fundamentals. Specifically, I find that at the peak, the entire REITs sector, 
comprised of 268 stocks, was priced as if the average future earnings growth rate 
across all these firms would be in the top decile of all existing individual firms in 
the past, and meanwhile, the required rate of return would be 0% over the years. 
The derivation is as follows: 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) show, that for a firm with supernormal return 
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where V denotes the total market value of the firm, debt plus equity, E 
represents earnings, r is the market rate of return and k denotes the investment to 
earnings ratio. 
Note that the “pass through” nature of REITs does not invalidate the model 
because the current value of a firm is determined by the value of the earning 
power of the currently held assets as well as the special earning opportunity and is 
independent of dividend policy. Alternatively, one can think of the investment to 
earnings ratio k, as ݇ ൌ ݇௜ ൅ ݇௘ , where ݇௜  denotes the fraction of total profits 
retained in the firm, and ݇௘ represents the amount of external capital raised as a 




   
 
Following Ofek and Richardson (2002), assume that for the first T periods 
these firms earn supernormal return ݎ∗ with a fraction k invested; after this initial 
period, these firms act like their “old economy” counterparts and achieve similar 
V/E ratios. In addition, assume a cost of capital of 0%, that is, investors require no 
return on the firm. Then, Equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
 ൬ܸܧ൰
ୗ୳୮ୣ୰ ୒୭୰୫ୟ୪
ൌ ሺ1 ൅ kݎ∗ሻ୘ ൬ܸܧ൰
୓୪ୢ
 (2) 
The aggregate investment to earnings ratio (k in the equation) of the REIT 
sector during the overpricing period is 86%, and the median value of individual 
REITs is 72%14. This implies that the annual earnings growth would have to reach 
27.7% (13.1%) for 5 (10) years for the EV/EBITDA ratio to drop from the peak 
of 32 to the target of 11. How large is 27.7% for 5 years?  Chan, Karceski and 
Lakonishok (2001) report that over a 5-year period from 1951-1998, the 90th 
percentile of the growth rates are 26.7% and 19.3% respectively for all firms and 
the two largest deciles15. This suggests that the required growth rate of the entire 
real estate sector is higher than the highest 10% of existing individual firms. 
                                                      
14 I estimate the investment of a REIT by the difference in the values of total real estate property in 
two consecutive years, adjusted for housing appreciation using the Case-Shiller Home Price Index. 
 
15 As Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2001) point out, their sample is subject to survivorship 





   
 
To conclude, my conjecture is that, if hedge fund managers performed similar 
back-of-the-envelope calculation as I discussed above, they should be aware of 
the overpricing in REITs beginning in 2003. 
In this section, I provide evidence on real estate overpricing. In the next 
section, I examine hedge fund investment in overpriced sector. 
V. Empirical Evidence 
In this section, I empirically test the hypothesis described in Section 2. 
A. Overview 
My hypothesis is that hedge funds are willing to invest in overpriced sector. I 
start by computing the weight of REITs in the aggregate hedge fund portfolio, 
defined as the total market value of all hedge funds holdings in REITs scaled by 
the total market value of their entire stock holdings. For comparison, I also 
compute the weight of REITs in the market portfolio, defined as the total market 
value of REITs scaled by the total market value of all stocks on CRSP. The hedge 
fund portfolio weights are compared to market portfolio weights rather than be 
judged by their absolute levels because price movements change portfolio weights 
over time. 
Figure 3 Panel A compares the weight of REITs in the aggregate hedge fund 




   
 
fund holdings in REITs were relatively small—less than 2.5% in the sample 
period. Second, hedge fund holdings in REITs increased from 1.7% to 2.3% from 
early 2003 to late 2006, exceeding the market portfolio by about 50% to 70%. 
Third, the weight of REITs in the aggregate hedge fund portfolio peaked in 
2006Q3, at least one quarter before the REIT prices peaked; and it declined 
sharply after 2006Q4, about one quarter before the market portfolio started to 
decline. The gap between the weights narrows gradually over the subsequent 
quarters. By mid-2007, the weight of REITs in the aggregate hedge fund portfolio 
is very close to the market portfolio. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
However, one cannot tell whether the earlier decline of hedge fund investment 
in REITs is because hedge funds unwound their long positions earlier than the 
market or not. It could be the case that the prices of REITs held by hedge funds 
dropped earlier. To rule out this situation, I compute the weight of REITs in the 
aggregate hedge fund portfolio by percentage of shares, denoted as the total 
shares of all hedge funds holdings in REITs scaled by the total shares of hedge 
funds holdings in entire stocks. For comparison, I also compute the weight of 
REITs in market portfolio by percentage of shares, denoted as the total 
outstanding shares of REITs scaled by the total outstanding shares of entire stocks 




   
 
in hedge funds portfolio (by percentage of shares) dropped heavily from its peak 
after 2006Q4, indicating that hedge funds were unwinding their long positions. 
This implies that hedge funds reacted to the real estate collapse earlier than the 
market. 
In summary, the preliminary analysis of long positions suggests that instead of 
attacking the real estate overpricing, hedge funds held more REITs than the 
market portfolio until early 2007. However, two further questions remain open 
after this initial analysis. First, hedge fund holdings in the real estate sector seem 
to be small in magnitude. Are they economically important?  Second, data on 
hedge fund long positions may not be quite informative about their true portfolio 
allocations. This is because hedge funds could have several short positions or 
derivative contracts that alter the direction of their long exposures. How would 
the potential short positions affect the analysis?  I address these issues in the next 
subsection. 
B. Return Regressions 
In this subsection, I back out hedge fund net exposures to REITs from a 
variety of hedge fund indexes. Similar to Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), I 
consider hedge funds that focus on stock trading. Assume that hedge fund returns 
can be written as the weighted average of the returns on the market portfolio with 




   
 
return. Also, assume that ߝ௧ is orthogonal to ܴெ,௧ and ܴோாூ்௦,௧16. Without loss of 
generality, one can think of hedge fund managers allocating their assets through 
two steps. First, allocate a fraction b (by value) of the total portfolio to the market 
portfolio. Second, to achieve the desired exposure to the real estate sector, 
reallocate a fraction g (by value) of the total portfolio from their market 
investment to the REITs portfolio. Then, the hedge fund return can be written as:   
 ܴ௧ ൌ ሺܾ െ ݃ሻܴெ,௧ ൅ ܴ݃ோாூ்௦,௧ ൅ ߝ௧ (3) 
where ߝ௧ is the idiosyncratic return. 
In previous subsection, I compare the weight of REITs in the hedge fund 
portfolio with ݉ோாூ்௦, the weight of REITs in the market portfolio. Here I want to 
take into account the short positions. In my model above, the net investment in 
REITs as a proportion of the total portfolio is ሺܾ െ ݃ሻ݉ோாூ்௦ ൅ ݃. Hence, the net 
investment in REITs as a proportion of hedge fund net investment in stocks b is:  
 ݓோாூ்௦ ൌ ሺܾ െ ݃ሻܾ ݉ோாூ்௦ ൅
݃
ܾ ൌ ݉ோாூ்௦ ൅
݃
ܾ ሺ1 െ ݉ோாூ்௦ሻ (4) 
To calculate ݓோாூ்௦, I estimate g and b from the following regression:  
 ܴ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܴெ,௧ ൅ ߛ൫ܴோாூ்௦,௧ െ ܴெ,௧൯ ൅ ߝ௧ (5) 
                                                      
16 This assumption is realistic since I exclude hedge funds that mainly invest in other asset classes 




   
 
Given my assumptions, it is easy to demonstrate that β=b, and γ=g. 
My hedge fund return data is comprised mainly of monthly hedge fund style 
indexes from Hedge Fund Research (HFR). HFR groups hedge funds according to 
their investment style and calculates performance indexes for each category. I 
choose styles that are likely to have significant exposure to stocks17. These hedge 
fund returns would reveal the potential offsetting effects of short sales on the long 
positions. My hedge fund return data also includes monthly return series on long-
only “copycat” funds, denoted 13F. I construct the series by adding up quarterly 
hedge fund holdings retrieved from 13F reports across all hedge funds. 
The monthly REIT returns are constructed from the MSCI U.S. REITs index 
available through the MSCI website 18 . The market factor ܴெ,௧  is the 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX composite return available through CRSP. For ease of 
reference, I denote the second factor, ܴோாூ்௦,௧ െ ܴெ,௧, the excess REITs factor.  
I run the time-series regression from January 2003 to June 2007, denoted as 
the overpricing period in this paper. The crisis period ranges from the “Quant 
meltdown” in the summer of 2007 to the trough of the stock market in March 
2009, following the practice of Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2010). I 
                                                      
17 For example, I exclude fixed income styles, distressed debt styles, etc. 
 
18 The results are similar when I use the NAREIT Real Estate 50 Index that tracks the performance 




   
 
check two issues in the regression. First, the correlation between the market factor 
and the excess REITs factor is -0.09 in the sample. This relatively small number 
suggests that the estimated regression coefficients are unbiased. Second, standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In all, if hedge funds were over (under) 
weighted in REITs compared to the market portfolio, the loadings of returns on 
REITs should be significantly positive (negative)19. 
Table 3 presents the loadings of hedge fund returns on REITs and the implied 
net weights of REITs in hedge funds’ portfolios. Panel A reports the results for 
different HFR style categories. The results show that the coefficients on the 
market factor have the signs and magnitude as I expected given the investment 
styles. For example, market-neutral funds have β ≈ 0, and short-bias hedge funds 
have β ≈ −1. Meanwhile, loadings on REITs are statistically insignificantly 
different from zero, except for the real estate funds. This indicates that the weight 
of REITs in most styles of hedge funds is similar to the market, which reflects that 
most hedge funds chose to invest in REITs only through their market portfolio. 
The loading on the excess REITs factor is negative and insignificant for short-
selling specialists, indicating that these funds were not trading against the real 
estate either. Since ோܹா has a different meaning when β < 0, I do not report it 
here. Not surprisingly, due to the artifact of sector focus, the real estate funds 
                                                      




   
 
have positive exposure to the excess REITs factor (0.214), and the coefficient is 
significant at the 1% statistical level. This indicates an implied weight of 0.34. 
However, according to the HFR index description20, the real estate style typically 
contains greater than 50% of portfolio exposure to real estate positions. This 
reflects the fact that these real estate expertise funds were not optimistic about the 
real estate segment during the overpricing period, and they invested less than the 
default level by either reducing their long positions in the sector or by having 
short positions that offset their long positions. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Panel B repeats the same exercises for the long-only “copycat” portfolios. 
Consistent with Panel A, the exposure to the excess REITs factor for the 
aggregate 13F hedge fund portfolio (13F) is negligible and insignificant, implying 
that hedge fund exposure to REITs is at the same level as the market. The results 
from Panel A and Panel B suggest that the 13F holdings data do a reasonable job 
in uncovering hedge fund exposure because short positions were not used by 
hedge funds to offset real estate exposure (except the real estate expertise). 
However, the results imply that the relatively higher weight of hedge funds 
compared to the market shown in Figure 3 Panel A is economically insignificant. 






   
 
and Nagel (2004), who find that hedge funds invested more in the technology 
stocks than the market portfolio. 
To sum up, my results are consistent with the hypothesis that hedge funds 
overall were holding REITs rather than selling short during the overpricing 
period. 
C. Time Pattern of Exposures 
A drawback of Equation (5) is that the regression estimate only yields the 
average fund exposure in the overpricing period. It could be possible that hedge 
funds’ short positions were concentrated in a short period and were not reflected 
in the static analysis. Hence, it would be interesting to see how the exposures 
estimated from returns evolve over time and how they match the pattern found in 
holdings. For this purpose, I extend the regression with time-varying coefficients, 
using the Kalman filter approach. Specifically I estimate the following state space 
model: 
 ܴ௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ߚ௧ܴெ,௧ ൅ ߛ௧൫ܴோாூ்௦,௧ െ ܴெ,௧൯ ൅ ߝ௧ (6) 




















where the disturbances ߝ௧  and ݒ௧  are normally distributed, mutually 
uncorrelated conditional on currently available information, and uncorrelated over 
time. I assume that shocks to alphas are completely transitory and shocks to factor 
loadings are persistent with parameter φ. These assumptions are necessary to keep 
the number for unknown parameters low enough given my relatively short 
sample. One can interpret ߙത , ̅ߚ and ̅ߛ as the steady-state coefficients. I run the 
Kalman filter iterations to find the maximum likelihood estimates for the 
parameters of the model. The values of the coefficients at date t are based on 
information up to that date. I then calculate the smoothed coefficients by using 
information through the end of the sample to improve the inference about the 
historical values that the coefficients took in the middle of the sample. 
Figure 4 presents the parameter estimates. Since my main interest lies in the 
hedge fund exposures to real estate stocks, I only report the time-varying 
coefficients on the excess REITs factor. In the interest of parsimony, I calculate 
the equal-weighted average of all HFR index returns except Short Bias and Real 
Estate and denote it as HFR. 13F is the same as defined in Table 3.  




   
 
The loadings estimated from hedge fund returns (HFR) and 13F returns (13F) 
are alligned with each other, indicating that my 13F holdings data are reasonable 
in revealing hedge fund exposures to the real estate sector. Moreover, the loadings 
estimated from hedge fund returns (HFR) vary around zero during the overpricing 
period, suggesting that hedge funds did not concentrate their short positions in a 
short period of time. 
VI. Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive sample of 434 hedge funds from 2003Q1 to 2009Q1, 
this paper investigates how hedge funds reacted to the recent real estate 
overpricing. I find that instead of selling short, hedge funds were holding 
overpriced real estate stocks. The findings are consistent with models in which 






   
 




Using a comprehensive sample of 434 hedge funds and their clientele 
informaiton, I study the effect of investor composition on hedge fund portfolio 
alloction. I find that retail-oriented hedge funds tend to invest more in overpriced 
real estate assets during the period of 2003Q1 to 2007Q2, even after controlling 
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I. Introduction 
There has been a growing literature on the difference between retail-oriented and 
institution-oriented funds. But whether and how did investor composition 
potentially affect the delegated portfolio managers’ investment strategies is less 
studied. We address this question in the paper. 
Building on earlier studies of how hedge funds invested in overpriced assets, 
this paper shows that the composition of a hedge fund’s investors affected money 
manager’s propensity to invest in overpriced stocks. My main finding is that 
retail-oriented hedge funds invested more in overpriced assets than their 
institutional counterparts. 
Specifically, I find that at different quantiles, the proportion of stock holdings 
devoted to REITs was higher for retail-oriented funds than for institution-oriented 
funds when overpricing persisted. However, this result does not necessarily 
indicate that investor composition affects hedge fund investment in overpriced 
assets. In fact, the result may be driven by retail-oriented hedge funds’ industry-
specific preference, which has nothing to do with investment in overpriced assets. 
To rule out this possibility, I examine the proportion of stock holdings devoted to 
REITs when overpricing collapsed. The previous result does not apply to this 




   
 
To quantify the effects of investor composition on managers’ investment 
strategies, I employ a Tobit difference-in-difference regression. The first 
difference is the difference between retail-oriented and institution-oriented hedge 
funds; the second difference is the difference between the overpricing period 
(2003Q1-2007Q2) and the crisis period (2007Q3-2009Q1). The results imply that 
the difference in the weight of REITs in retail-oriented hedge fund portfolio and 
in institution-oriented hedge fund portfolio was 20% higher when the assets were 
overpriced. The difference is significant at less than the 10% statistical level. 
Alternatively, my results might well be driven by fund characteristics, which 
have nothing to do with investor composition. For instance, frequently traded 
hedge funds could be more likely to chase short-term performance; thus, they 
might be more willing to invest in overpriced stocks. Similarly, large funds might 
be more willing to invest in overpriced stocks because they have more funds 
available when asset prices go against them; and concentrated funds might be 
more willing to do so because they have more specialized information. 
I address this point by including fund level control variables such as the fund 
turnover ratio, size, the Herfindahl Index to measure portfolio concentration, and 
their respective interactions with a dummy variable for whether the real estate 




   
 
fund characteristics. More generally, I include fund dummies to control for any 
unobserved fund fixed effect and find similar results. 
Since this paper is built on Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), which analyzes 
hedge fund investment in the technology bubble, it would be interesting to see if 
the investor composition effect also applies to that sample. Using data on the 
holdings of retail-oriented and institution-oriented hedge funds from 1998Q1 to 
2002Q4, I find that the difference in the weight of technology stocks in the two 
types of hedge funds was 20% higher when these stocks were overpriced. In 
particular, the difference is statistically significant at less than the 5% level. 
The empirical findings can be explained by two pieces of literature. First, in 
funds where flows are more sensitive to past performance, delegated portfolio 
managers are more likely to engage in strategies that will deliver better 
performance in the short run (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jin and Kogan, 2007). 
They tend to invest in overpriced assets that have not crashed yet because failure 
to include these assets in their portfolios will hurt performance relative to their 
peers and trigger outflows. Following substantial outflows, funds need to readjust 
their portfolios and conduct costly and unprofitable trades, which further damage 
future returns (Edelen, 1999; Coval and Stafford, 2005).  
Second, flows are more sensitive to past performance in retail-oriented funds 




   
 
that retail mutual fund flows are significantly more sensitive to past fund 
performance than institutional mutual fund flows. Similarly, Dahlquist and 
Martinez (2012) show that inflows and outflows are strongly correlated with 
measures of past performance in mutual funds but not in pension funds whose 
investors are large institutions21. The intuition is that retail investors are less 
sophisticated and have less information than institutional investors. Moreover, an 
individual investor usually holds only a small proportion of the fund shares and is 
thus more affected by others. When a fund’s performance is poor, the expectation 
that other investors will withdraw their money reduces the expected return from 
staying in the fund and increases the incentive for each individual investor to 
withdraw as well (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2010).  
I test these explanations using my sample data. First, my story relies on the 
premise that retail-oriented hedge funds face steeper flow-performance 
sensitivity. I confirm this premise in the data. Second, given that flows are more 
reactive in retail-oriented hedge funds, one would expect that these funds have 
higher flow volatility. I find evidence that is consistent with this view. 
My paper contributes to the hedge fund literature. To date, much of the 
research on hedge funds focuses on manager skills and risk-return tradeoffs (e.g., 
Edwards and Caglayan, 2001; Liang, 2001; Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov, 
                                                      
21 This is different from Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), who find that pension clients punish poorly 




   
 
2010). Others have focused on the real impact of hedge fund activism (Brav, 
Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009). To the best of my 
knowledge, this paper is the first to test the effect of investor composition on 
hedge fund investment strategies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I outline the 
hypothesis and discuss the underlying premise. In Section III, I discuss the data 
collection process. In Section IV, I test my hypothesis on the effect of investor 
composition on the investment strategies. Section V provides evidence that 
supports the premise of my hypothesis. Finally, Section VI concludes. 
II. Hypothesis  
The pattern that hedge funds are holding overpriced assets before the market 
collapses is more prominent in retail-oriented hedge funds than in institution-
oriented funds.  
In delegated portfolio management, managers are concerned about short-term 
performances because flows are subject to run (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In 
funds where flows are more sensitive to past performance, managers are more 
likely to invest in overpriced assets because failure to include these assets in their 
portfolios will hurt their performance relative to peers and trigger outflows. 




   
 
conduct costly and unprofitable trades, which further damage the future returns 
(e.g., Edelen, 1999; Coval and Stafford, 2005). 
The premise that underlies my hypothesis is that flows are more sensitive to 
past performance in retail-oriented funds, i.e., retail-oriented funds face steeper 
flow-performance sensitivity than institution-oriented funds. James and Karceski 
(2002) document this effect using mutual funds data from 1995 to 2001. 
Similarly, Dahlquist and Martinez (2012) compare mutual funds with pension 
funds and find that the flow-performance sensitivity only exists in mutual funds. 
Moreover, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) suggest that an individual investor, 
who holds only a small proportion of the fund‘s shares, is more affected by 
others; in contrast, an institutional investor, who typically owns a larger percent of 
the fund, knows that by not withdrawing she guarantees that her shares will not 
contribute to the overall damage caused by withdrawals of the fund’s assets. 
While this effect is mainly documented among mutual funds, I conjecture that 
the same effect is in place within hedge funds. This is realistic because hedge 
funds investors are observed to react to funds’ past performance despite various 
restrictions such as lock-up periods (e.g., Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross, 2003; 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2004; Baquero and Verbeek, 2005; Ding, Getmansky, 
Liang, and Wermers, 2009). For example, consider two prominent hedge funds—




   
 
In 1999, Tiger shorted the technology segment and lost about 25% of its assets 
through withdrawals in the final quarter. Later, Tiger announced its liquidation 
just when prices of technology stocks started to tumble. In contrast, during the 
third quarter of 1999, Soros benefited from the run-up of the bubble by increasing 
the proportion invested in the technology segment and attracted new capital22. 
III. Data Collection 
My database contains hedge funds’ clientele information based on Form ADV 
filings in 2006 and will be combined with my database on institutional holdings to 
analyze the effect of investor composition. The SEC requires that all registered 
investment advisers file their Form ADVs within 90 days of the adviser’s fiscal 
year-end and disclose information on their businesses, clients, employees on the 
Investment Adviser Registration Depository (IARD) system. On Form ADV Item 
5 Question D, a filing investment adviser is required to report the approximate 
percentage that each type of client comprises of its total number of clients. These 
clients include individuals, high net worth individuals, banking or thrift 
institutions, investment companies, pension and profit sharing plans, pooled 
investment vehicles, charitable organizations, corporations, state or municipal 
government entities, foundations, etc. In this paper, a hedge fund is classified as 






   
 
clients, and it is classified as institution-oriented if the rest of investors compose 
over 50% of its clients. 
I observe a snapshot of the clientele information rather than a time-series 
because once an investment adviser files the most recent Form ADV to the SEC 
through the IARD system, information from the previous year is replaced. To test 
my hypothesis, I assume that these funds do not switch between retail-oriented 
and institution-oriented during the sample period. This assumption is realistic. 
Anecdotally, hedge funds understand the difference in the needs of individual 
investors and institutional investors; therefore, they target specific clients based 
on their own advantages23. Furthermore, by retrieving a random sample of 50 
hedge funds and comparing their clientele information in my dataset and their 
most recent records on the SEC website, I find that only one out of the 50 funds 
switched its type, or more specifically, from retail-oriented to institution-oriented 
fund. Based on disclosed information, this change is likely due to an acquisition 
transaction in 2010. 
The final list consists of 434 hedge funds, among which 111 are retail-
oriented, and 323 are institution-oriented. Notable funds such as Citadel 
Investment Group and Private Capital Management are classified as retail, and 
D.E.Shaw and Paulson are classified as institutional. My unique hedge fund 
                                                      




   
 
dataset is free of selection biases, while commercial hedge fund databases such as 
CISDM, Eureka, HFR, MSCI, and TASS all suffer from the self-reporting 
problems (see Malkiel and Saha (2005), Ang, Rhodes-Kropf and Zhao (2008), 
and Agarwal, Fos and Jiang (2010)). Since my hedge fund data are collected at 
the manager level, I use “hedge fund” and “hedge fund manager” interchangeably 
throughout this paper. 
IV. Empirical Evidence 
A. Overview 
My hypothesis predicts that retail-oriented hedge funds are more likely to 
invest in the overpriced sector than institution-oriented funds. The intuition is that 
in retail funds where flows are more sensitive to past performance, if managers 
fail to capture the upturn of the overpricing, their poor performance relative to the 
peers will trigger more outflows, which further dampen the performance. 
The time-varying regression results in Essay 2 suggest that my 13F holdings 
data do not paint a misleading picture of hedge fund exposure to real estate 
stocks. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, I return to the 13F holdings data to 
address questions at the fund level. Specifically, I compute for each hedge fund 
the weight of REITs in its portfolio at the end of each quarter. The weight of 
REITs in a hedge fund’s portfolio is defined as the market value of REITs held by 




   
 
Then, for each quarter end, I rank the weights within each group of hedge funds, 
namely, the retail-oriented funds and the institution-oriented funds. A hedge fund 
is classified as retail-oriented (or institution-oriented) if individuals or high net 
worth individuals represent over (under) 50% of its total clients. 
Figure 1 plots the 90th, 80th, 60th, and 40th percentiles of weights for retail 
and institution-oriented funds at the end of each quarter from 2003Q1-2009Q1. 
An interesting pattern is that, for the 80th, 60th, and 40th percentiles of weights 
shown in the figure, retail-oriented hedge funds allocated more of their stock 
holdings to REITs than institutional funds prior to mid-200724. The gap between 
the weights in retail funds and institutional funds reduces significantly thereafter. 
Overall, the figure seems to suggest that retail-oriented hedge funds were over-
invested in REITs compared to their institutional counterparts during the 
overpricing period. 
B. Regression 
A simple way to evaluate how investor composition affects hedge funds’ 
reaction to overpricing is to compare the holdings of REITs in retail funds’ 
portfolios and institutional funds’ portfolios during the overpricing period and 
estimate the difference. However, the problem with this pure cross section 
approach is that there might be systematic, unmeasured differences in retail hedge 
                                                      





   
 
funds and institutional hedge funds that have nothing to do with investor 
composition. As a result, attributing the difference in weights in the overpricing 
period to investor composition might be misleading. 
A common solution to this problem is the difference-in-difference 
methodology. By adding a comparison period, this methodology compares the 
cross-sectional variation (the first difference) in the overpricing period and a non-
overpricing period (the second difference). Here I include the crisis period 
(2007Q3-2009Q1) rather than the pre-2003 period as a comparison. This is 
because certain REITs may have started to see their stock prices shooting up prior 
to 2003, while by 2009Q1 the gains on the REITs Index had been wiped out. 
Hence, my way of selecting the sample period is parsimonious. 
The difference-in-difference methodology allows for both the investor 
composition effect and the time effect. Nevertheless, unbiasedness of the 
estimator still requires that investor composition is not systematically related to 
other factors that affect weights and are hidden in residuals. To this end, I 
estimate the following specification from 2003Q1 to 2009Q1 using quarterly data 




   
 
 ܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ௝,௧ ൌ ߚܱݒ݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ ൅ ߛܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ ൅ ߜܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ܱݒ݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧
൅ 	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߝ௝,௧ (1)
where Weight is a fund’s portfolio allocation to REITs as defined above. 
Overprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the data observation is between 
2003Q1 to 2007Q2 and zero otherwise. Retail is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the fund is retail-oriented and zero otherwise. 
Control variables (Controls) include fund size (Size, in log million dollars), 
fund turnover ratio (Turnover, in percentage points) and fund herfindahl index 
(Herfindahl, in percentage points) that measures the concentration of a fund’s 
investment. All variables are lagged with one quarter. These variables are fund 
characteristics that may affect weights. For example, funds that trade more 
frequently are more likely to chase short-term performance, thus, they might be 
more willing to invest in the overpriced stocks. Similarly, large funds might be 
more willing to do so because they have more funds available when asset prices 
go against them; concentrated funds might be more willing to do so because they 
have more specialized information. The control variables enter both directly and 
interactively with the overpricing dummy. In selected specifications, fund 
dummies are included to control for any unobserved fund fixed effect. There are 




   
 
I use a censored regression (i.e., Tobit) model to estimate the coefficients 
because the dependent variable Weight in the regression is non-negative and has a 
spike in the histogram at zero. In addition, standard errors in the estimation adjust 
for heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlations at the fund level. 
The coefficient of interest, δ, measures how the difference in the weight of 
REITs in retail-oriented funds and the weight of REITs in institutional funds 
varies when the real estate sector is overpriced. If investor composition does not 
affect hedge fund investment strategies in the overpriced sector, δ is expected to 
be zero. Under my hypothesis, δ is expected to be positive because retail hedge 
funds are more likely to invest in overpriced assets. 
Table 1 shows how investor composition affects hedge fund investment in the 
overpriced real estate stocks. Column (1) controls for fund characteristics except 
for fund size and indicates that the difference in the weight between retail-
oriented funds and institution-oriented funds is 0.489% higher when REITs are 
overpriced and is statistically significant at the 10% level. Column (2) adds the 
fund dummies and the effect drops to 0.454%. Column (4) shows that this pattern 
is repeated even when fund size and fund fixed dummies are all included. Since a 
representative hedge fund invests about 2% in REITs during the overpricing 
period, this translates into about 21% (0.43% divided by 2%) more investment in 




   
 
portfolio. The estimates in Table 1 are therefore consistent with the hypothesis 
that retail-oriented hedge funds are more likely to invest in the overpriced assets. 
[Insert Table 1] 
C. Technology Sample 
In previous subsection, I test my hypothesis in the real estate sample. One 
potential concern is that the effect of investor composition on hedge fund 
investment in REITs may be caused by fund preference to this particular sector. 
While this is unlikely since I employed the difference-in-difference methodology 
which is aimed at eliminating this explanation, a direct way to address this 
concern is to test my hypothesis in another episode of overpricing: the technology 
bubble period. 
Following Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), for each month from January 
1998 to December 2002, I rank the P/S (price to sales) ratios of all stocks in the 
Nasdaq market into five quintiles. Then I form five portfolios based on their P/S 
quintiles. These portfolios are rebalanced every month. The top quintile portfolio 
is defined as the Tech sector (or high P/S portfolio). 
Figure 2 presents the cumulative return of three portfolios: High, Median and 
Low P/S portfolios. Similar to the literature, the Tech sector (high P/S) 




   
 
increased dramatically after early 1998 until August 2000, when it peaks at 10. 
The cumulative return fell thereafter. In contrast, the mid P/S and Low P/S 
portfolios did not exhibit such a pattern. The figure suggests that this 
parsimonious P/S grouping seems valid in picking up the overpriced stocks. Since 
the previous literature has conducted thorough analyses on the overall hedge fund 
investment in the overpriced sector, my focus here is to examine how investor 
composition affects their strategies. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
I repeat the analysis of Table 1 in the sample of the technology overpricing. 
The sample consists of an overpricing period from 1998Q1 to 2000Q4 and a 
comparison period that ranges from 2001Q1 to 2002Q4. The overpricing period 
ends in 2000Q4 rather than 2000Q1 when the Nasdaq index reached its peak 
because Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) show that individual stocks may reach 
their price peaks before or after the overall peak, and hedge funds were picking 
stocks that have not yet crashed until the end of 2002. As before, I choose the 
collapsing period rather than pre-1998 period as a comparison. 
In the estimation, the dependent variable Weight is the weight of high P/S 
stocks in a hedge fund portfolio, defined as the market value of high P/S stocks 
held by a hedge fund scaled by the market value of the fund’s entire stock 




   
 
is between 1998Q1 and 2000Q4, and zero otherwise. Other explanatory variables 
are the same as before. There are 3598 fund-quarter level observations in each of 
the regressions. 
Table 2 shows that the results are consistent with those in Table 1. In detail, 
Column (1) shows that by controlling for fund Herfindahl index and turnover 
ratio, the difference in the weight between retail-oriented funds and institution-
oriented funds is 2.39% higher when the technology sector is overpriced and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. Column (2) adds fund fixed 
dummies and the difference increases to 3.20% and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Column (4) finds similar pattern when adding fund size and fund 
dummies as controls. Since the average weight of technology stocks in a hedge 
fund portfolio is 15.6% in the overpricing period, this implies that retail-oriented 
hedge funds invested about 19% (e.g., 3% divided by 15.6%) more in the 
overpriced technology stocks than their institutional counterparts. Again, the 
results support my hypothesis that investor composition affects hedge fund 
investment in overpriced assets. 
[Insert Table 2] 
In this section, I show that retail-oriented hedge funds tend to invest more in 
overpriced assets. In the next section, I provide additional evidence that support 




   
 
V. Mechanism 
My story that retail-oriented hedge funds are more likely to invest in 
overpriced assets relies on the assumption that they face steeper flow-performance 
sensitivity. I test this premise in Subsection 1. Furthermore, if flows react more to 
performance in retail-oriented hedge funds, one would expect that they have 
higher flow volatility. I examine this view in Subsection 2. 
A. Flow-Performance Sensitivity 
As elaborated in Section 2, the underlying assumption of my hypothesis is that 
retail-oriented hedge funds face steeper flow-performance sensitivity than their 
institutional counterparts when performance is poor. An ideal dataset to test this 
premise should include individual hedge fund flows, returns, assets under 
management and other relevant fund level information. Unfortunately, I do not 
have access to such databases. However, following the standard practice in the 
fund literature, I can still estimate these variables based on hedge fund holdings. 
Specifically, following Agarwal, Fos and Jiang (2010), I construct the quarterly 
flows for each hedge fund as below: 
 ܨ݈݋ݓ௝,௧ ൌ ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ െ ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ିଵሺ1 ൅ ܴ݁ݐ௝,௧ሻܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ିଵ  (2)
where Size is the total value of the fund’s quarter-end equity portfolio, using 




   
 
Ret is the value-weighted return of all stocks in the hedge fund’s portfolio over 
the quarter. Flow measures the change in the value of the fund’s equity portfolio 
due to changes in investment by the fund’s investors and not due to the changes in 
the stock prices; therefore, it is a proxy for the net fund flows. 
To estimate the performance of a fund relative to its peers, I apply a 
modification of the methodology used by Sirri and Tufano (1998) in their study of 
the mutual fund flow-performance relation, which involves two steps. First, for 
each hedge fund, I calculate the fractional rank, Perctj,t , from 0 to 1, based on the 
return on the fund’s portfolio (Ret) during quarter t. Second, I calculate the 
bottom rank ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧௅ , and the top rank ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ு  as follows: 
 ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧௅ ൌ ܯ݅݊ ሺ12 , ܲ݁ݎܿݐ௝,௧ሻ (3)
 ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ு ൌ ܯ݅݊ ൬12 , ܲ݁ݎܿݐ௝,௧ െ ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧
௅ ൰  (4)
Then, the following regression is specified to test the effect of investor 
composition on flow-performance sensitivity.  
ܨ݈݋ݓ௝,௧ ൌ ߚ௅ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ିଵ௅ ൅ ߚுܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ିଵு ൅ ߛ௅ܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ ∙ ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ିଵ௅ ൅ ߛுܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ ∙




   
 
In Equation (12), ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ିଵ௅  and ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ିଵு  are lagged by one quarter to capture 
the fund’s past relative performance. The dummy variable for whether the hedge 
fund is retail-oriented (Retail) enters both directly and interactively with the 
performance measures. Control variables (Controls) include fund size (Size, in log 
million dollars), fund Herfindahl index (Herfindahl, in percentage points), fund 
age (Age, in log years) and fund turnover ratio (Turnover, in percentage points), 
all lagged with one quarter. Control variables also include fund’s lagged flows 
(Flow(−1)). These variables are shown in the prior literature to affect hedge fund 
flows. If retail-oriented hedge funds have higher flow-performance sensitivity 
than institution-oriented hedge funds when performance is poor, the coefficient γL 
is expected to be positive. 
Table 3 presents how investor composition affects hedge funds’ flow-
performance sensitivity. Column (4) shows that the coefficient of interest, the 
cross-term of retail dummy and the bottom rank of performance, is 0.07 and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. This suggests that for a 1% increase in 
the fractional rank of returns in the poor performance region, flows of retail-
oriented hedge funds increase roughly 0.07% more than their institutional 
counterparts, consistent with my hypothesis. However, flows seem rather 
insensitive to past poor performance in institution-oriented funds in my sample. In 




   
 
previous literature. For example, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) find the 
relation is between 0.27% and 0.70% depending on the measure. The fact that 
these variables are constructed from 13F holdings data might have clouded the 
analysis. 
[Insert Table 3] 
B. Flow Volatility 
So far I have shown that retail-oriented hedge funds face steeper flow-
performance sensitivity. If flows react to fund’s performance to a greater extent, 
they are expected to be more volatile as well. Another way of interpreting this is 
investor’s patience (e.g., Jin and Kogan, 2007; Greene, Hodges, and Rakowski, 
2007). If flows are more sensitive to past performance, then these investors must 
be less patient and be more likely to move their flows in and out of the funds; 
therefore, flows are more volatile. 
For a summary estimate of the effect of investor composition on flow 
volatility, I conduct the following cross-sectional regression and report the results 
in Table 4. 
 ܸ݋݈ி௟௢௪ೕ ൌ ߛܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ ൅ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝ ൅ ߝ௝  (6)
In Column (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the standard deviation of a 




   
 
variable is the standard deviation of a fund’s absolute flow during the sample. 
Greene, Hodges, and Rakowski (2007) suggest that this measure is more relevant 
when considering the overall response of investors to share restrictions. In all 
regressions, Retail is a dummy variable for whether a fund is retail-oriented. 
Control variables (Controls) include the sample averages of a fund’s turnover 
ratio (Turnover, in percentage points), fund Herfindahl index (Herfindahl, in 
percentage points) and fund size (Size, in log million dollars). I also control for 
fund age (Age, in log years). All observations are collected at the fund level. The 
coefficient of interest, γ, is expected to be positive if retail-oriented hedge funds 
have higher flow volatility. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Table 4 shows that consistent with my prediction, retail-oriented hedge funds 
have higher flow volatility. This is indicated by the positive coefficient estimates 
on Retail in all specifications. Meanwhile, all coefficients are statistically 
significant at less than the 5% level. Specifically, the estimated coefficient for 
Retail is 0.016 in Column (3), indicating that the sample average of flow volatility 
in retail-oriented hedge funds is 40% (0.016 versus 0.04) higher than that in 
institutional funds, everything else being equal. When we take the absolute value 
of flows, flow volatility is 20% (0.008/0.04) higher for the retail funds. The 




   
 
standard deviation is reduced. The results provide support for my prediction that 
flows in retail-oriented hedge funds are more volatile. 
In sum, empirical evidence suggests that retail-oriented hedge funds have 
steeper flow-performance sensitivity and more volatile fund flows. These findings 
support the mechanism of my story that retail funds are more likely to invest in 
overpriced assets. As a caveat, though, I want to point out that my data on hedge 
fund flows and returns are calculated from the 13F holdings and are therefore 
proxies. In this respect, one should view this section as a study of the premise, 
rather than as a formal test on the theory. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigate how investor composition affected hedge fund 
exposure to overpriced assets. I find that the difference in the proportion of REITs 
in retail-oriented hedge fund portfolio and institution-oriented hedge fund 
portfolio was 20% more when the assets were overpriced. I further show that this 
difference in hedge fund exposures could stem from the difference in flow-
performance sensitivities in the two types of funds. 
There are a number of avenues for future work. For example, fund flows and 
performance analyzed in this paper are indirectly estimated through hedge fund 




   
 
(such as TASS) combined with the clientele information would serve better to test 
the effect of investor composition on flow-performance sensitivity. It would also 
be interesting to examine how risk-adjusted performance and risk-taking 

















































Figure 2. Effects of Past Performance on Sub-advisor Change: 
A Semiparametric Analysis 
 
The figure plots the probability of changing a sub-advisor, estimated from the 
following equations: 
ܲ൫ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ൌ 1| ௜ܺ,௧൯ ൌ expሼ݂ሺ ௜ܺ,௧ሻሽ1 ൅ expሼ݂ሺ ௜ܺ,௧ሻሽ 
݂൫ ௜ܺ,௧൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴ݁ݐܧݔܥܽݐ௜,ሾ௧ି଺,௧ିଵሿሻ ൅ ߚܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
 
The vertical axis is the probability of a mutual fund changing a sub-advisor in 
month t (ܲሺܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁௜,௧ ൌ 1ሻ) and the horizontal axis is the fund’s past return 
performance, measured by the monthly excess return relative to benchmark 
averaged over months t-6 to t-1 (ܴ݁ݐܧݔܥܽݐ୧,ሾ୲ି଺,୲ିଵሿ ). Control is a vector of 
control variables that include fund size, fund age and past flows. The estimation 
of ݂ሺ∙ሻ applies the method introduced by Robinson (1988) and used by Chevalier 





































Figure 3. Sub-Advisor Average Excess Return by Time around Hiring 
 
The horizontal axis measures time, in months, around a sub-advisor is hired by a 
mutual fund. The vertical axis measures the monthly average RetExCat across all 
targeted sub-advisors. Sub-advisor RetExCat is the monthly excess return of a sub-
advisor, estimated as the value weighted average of excess returns of mutual funds that 
it sub-advises to. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval of the mean by 
month. To correct for cross correlation, sub-advisors that are hired during the same 



































Figure 4. Sub-Advisor Average Excess Return by Time around Firing 
 
The horizontal axis measures time, in months, around a sub-advisor is fired by a mutual 
fund. The vertical axis measures the monthly average RetExCat across all targeted sub-
advisors. Sub-advisor RetExCat is the monthly excess return of a sub-advisor, estimated 
as the value weighted average of excess returns of mutual funds that it sub-advises to. 
The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval of the mean by month. To correct 
for cross correlation, sub-advisors that are hired during the same month are aggregated 


































Figure 5. Mutual Fund Average Excess Return by Time around Sub-Advisor 
Change 
 
In Panel A, the horizontal axis measures time, in months, around the event when a 
mutual fund actively changes its sub-advisors. In Panel B, the horizontal axis measures 
time, in months, around the event when a mutual fund fires all of its sub-advisor(s) and 
hires completely different new ones (referred as Whole Portfolio Change in this paper). 
The vertical axis measures the monthly average RetExCat across all targeted mutual 
funds, where RetExCat is the monthly return of the fund (before fees) in excess of that 
of the category. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval of the mean by 
month. To correct for cross correlation, funds in which sub-advisor change takes place 
during the same month are aggregated into one portfolio.  
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A. Essay 1 
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
The sample contains 145,024 fund-month observations of 3,214 sub-advised funds from 
December 2006 to September 2012. Data are obtained from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) mutual fund database. Panel A defines all variables. Panel B 






Panel A. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Mutual Fund Level  
Age Number of years since the fund’s inception. 
Change Dummy=1 if an active change in sub-advisor takes place in fund. 
Equity Dummy=1 if fund is an equity fund. 
ExpRatio Expenses of a fund as a percentage of total assets. 
ExpExCat Monthly expense ratio of a fund in excess of that of all funds in 
the same category. 
ExpExSub Monthly expense ratio of a fund in excess of that of sub-advised 
funds in the same category. 
ExpExQtl Monthly expense ratio of a fund in excess of that of funds in the 
same quintile (based on past 12 month return before fees). 
Flow Monthly percentage net flow into the fund. 
Flow[t1,t2] Monthly percentage net flow into the fund, averaged over the 
months [t1,t2]. 
FOF Dummy=1 if fund is a fund of fund. 
Index Dummy=1 if fund is an index fund. 
Out[t1,t2] Equals one if Flow[t1,t2] is negative, otherwise equals zero. 
RetExCat Monthly return of a fund (before fees) in excess of that of the 
category. 
RetExCat[t1,t2] Monthly return of a fund (before fees) in excess of that of all 
funds in the same category, averaged over the months [t1,t2]. 
Poor[t1,t2] Equals one if RetExCat[t1,t2] is negative, otherwise equals zero. 
RetExSub Monthly return of a fund (before fees) in excess of that of sub-
advised funds in the same category. 
RetExQtl Monthly return of a fund (before fees) in excess of that of funds 
in the same quintile (based on past 12 month return before fees). 
Size Total asset value of a fund, in millions. 
  
Sub-Advisor Level  
RetExCat Monthly excess return of a sub-advisor, estimated by the value 
weighted average of RetExCat of mutual funds that it sub-advises 
to. 
Fund - Sub-Advisor 
Level 
 







Panel B. Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. p1 p50 p99 
Age 7.8 7.8 0.1 4.8 38.9 
Change 1.06% 10.24% 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ExpRatio 1.10% 0.56% 0.14% 1.05% 2.68% 
Flow 0.77% 7.87% -17.38% -0.22% 37.03% 
Flow[-6,-1] 1.01% 6.32% -8.69% -0.23% 31.56% 
Flow[-12,-7] 1.12% 6.43% -8.31% -0.17% 31.52% 
Flow[-24,-13] 1.49% 6.48% -6.03% -0.02% 31.27% 
Flow[-36,-25] 1.77% 7.23% -5.77% 0.09% 35.79% 
RetExCat -0.04% 2.07% -5.22% -0.02% 4.98% 
RetExCat[-6,-1] -0.03% 0.78% -2.35% -0.01% 2.12% 
RetExCat[-12,-7] -0.02% 0.78% -2.31% -0.01% 2.15% 
RetExCat[-24,-13] -0.01% 0.54% -1.52% -0.01% 1.54% 
RetExCat[-36,-25] -0.01% 0.54% -1.48% -0.01% 1.58% 








Table 2. Overview of Sub-advisor Changes 
  
Panel A. Sub-Advisor Change by Category 
 
In this Panel, Column (1) presents the number of sub-advisor changes in each category. 
Column (2) presents the total assets (in millions) of sub-advisor changes in each category. 
Sample period ranges from December 2006 to September 2012. Passive Change refers to 
a sub-advisor change when a fund liquidates, merges, or establishes. Active Change 
refers to the situations when a fund fires, hires, or hires and fires at least one sub-advisor 
at the same time.  
 
 (1) Number of Occurrence (2) Assets (in Millions) 
Passive Change   
Liquidation 57 $3,031.50 
Merge 102 $93,088.75 
New Fund 119 $7,556.73 
Total 278 $103,676.97 
Active Change   
Fire 274 $222,529.43 
Hire 320 $433,047.90 
Hire and Fire 940 $473,221.09 
Total 1534 $1,128,798.42 
 
 
Panel B. Percentage of Sub-Advisor Active Change by Year and Performance 
 
This Panel presents the number of active sub-advisor changes in each year-performance 
category as a percentage of the number of all sub-advised funds in that category. 
RetExCat[-12,-1] is the monthly return of a fund (before fees) in excess of that of all 
funds in the same category, averaged over the 12 months before sub-advisor change.  
 
 (1) RetExCat[-12,-1]<=0 (2) RetExCat[-12,-1]>0 
2006 2.2% 0.9% 
2007 13.7% 10.7% 
2008 20.1% 10.1% 
2009 16.2% 10.6% 
2010 15.2% 7.2% 
2011 12.7% 11.3% 
2012 9.3% 6.9% 
 
(Note: sub-advisor change in 2006 only includes data in December; sub-advisor change 





Panel C. Comparing Composition of Funds:  
Funds with Active Sub-Advisor Changes v.s. Sub-Advised Funds 
 
Panel C compares the composition of funds that have active sub-advisor changes and 
funds that are sub-advised. Funds can be classified into different groups by their structure, 
sub-advisor change type and size. Column (1) presents the number of funds that have 
active sub-advisor changes in each group, as a percentage of the total number of funds 
that have active sub-advisor changes. Column (2) presents the number of sub-advised 
funds in each group as a percentage of the total number of sub-advised funds.  
 
 
 Active Change Sub-Advised 
By Structure   
Multi-managed 75.3% 70.3% 
Single-managed 24.7% 29.7% 
By Change Type   
Whole Portfolio Change* 40.9% NA 
Partial Portfolio Change** 59.1% NA 
By Size   
<10MM 5.7% 5.2% 
10MM-100MM 26.5% 24.9% 
100MM-1000MM 48.2% 51.4% 
>1000MM 19.6% 18.5% 
 
* Whole Portfolio Change refers to the situation that a mutual fund fires all of its sub-
advisor(s) and hires completely different new sub-advisor(s).  








Table 3. Percentage of Mutual Funds with Sub-Advisor Change: 
Double Sorted by Past Performance and Flow 
 
The table presents the monthly average of the percentage of mutual funds with sub-
advisor changes, double sorted by their past 1 year RetExCat (relative return to Lipper 
category) and past 1 year flow.  
 















  1 2 3 4 5 5-1 
1 1.66% 1.74% 1.46% 1.24% 1.02% -0.64%**(-2.28) 
2 1.62% 1.51% 1.37% 0.96% 0.82% -0.80%***(-3.43) 
3 1.08% 1.20% 1.10% 0.75% 0.92% -0.17% (-0.82) 
4 1.46% 1.39% 0.83% 0.85% 0.93% -0.53%**(-2.11) 
5 0.86% 0.98% 0.48% 0.63% 0.61% -0.25% (-1.37) 


















Table 4. Effects of Fund Prior Performance on Sub-advisor Change 
 
This table presents estimated coefficients from probit regressions. The dependent variable 
is the dummy variable that equals one if the fund changed its sub-advisor in month t and 
zero otherwise (Change). RetExCat[t1,t2] equals the monthly average return of a fund 
(before fees) in excess of that of all funds in the same category in months [t1, t2]. 
Poor[t1,t2] is a dummy variable that equals one if RetExCat[t1,t2] is negative and zero 
otherwise. Table 1 lists the detailed definitions and calculations of all variables in the 
regression. All estimations include controls for past flows and year–month fixed effects. 
Observations are at the fund -month level. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity 
and within-cluster correlation clustered at the fund level, and therefore the effective 
number of observations is on the order of number of funds. *, ** and *** indicate 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
RetExCat[-6,-1] -16.121*** -16.117*** -15.247*** -15.809***
 (4.872) (4.982) (5.007) (5.074) 
Poor[-6,-1] 0.021 0.015 0.013 0.011 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
RetExCat[-6,-1]* Poor[-6,-1] 12.381** 11.332* 9.489 10.155 
 (6.077) (6.330) (6.483) (6.567) 
RetExCat[-12,-7]  -19.206*** -18.039*** -19.412***
  (5.250) (5.198) (5.255) 
Poor[-12,-7]  0.007 0.004 0.001 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
RetExCat[-12,-7]* Poor[-12,-7]  12.348* 9.642 11.146* 
  (6.495) (6.474) (6.500) 
RetExCat[-24,-13]   -21.650*** -24.318***
   (7.297) (7.309) 
Poor[-24,-13]   -0.014 -0.022 
   (0.034) (0.034) 
RetExCat[-24,-13]* Poor[-24,-13]   17.852* 21.383** 
   (10.362) (10.297) 
RetExCat[-36,-25]    1.822 
    (6.003) 
Poor[-36,-25]    0.026 
    (0.036) 
RetExCat[-36,-25]* Poor[-36,-25]    -13.645 
    (8.488) 
Size(Ln) 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.022** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age(Ln) 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.028 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
     
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for Past Flows Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 89,215 89,215 89,215 89,215 





Table 5. Effects of Prior Flows on Sub-advisor Change 
 
This table presents estimated coefficients from Probit regressions. The dependent 
variable is the dummy variable that equals one if the fund changed its sub-advisor in 
month t and zero otherwise (Change). Flow[t1, t2] equals the monthly average 
percentage net flow into the fund in months [t1, t2]. Out[t1, t2] equals one if Flow[t1, t2] 
is negative and zero otherwise. Table 1 lists the detailed definitions and calculations of all 
variables in the regression. Observations are at the fund -month level. All estimations 
include controls for past performance and year-month fixed effects. Standard errors 
adjust for heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation clustered at the fund level, and 
therefore the effective number of observations is on the order of number of funds. *, ** 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flow[-6, -1] -0.375 -0.330 -0.323 -0.326 
 (0.336) (0.310) (0.321) (0.318) 
Out[-6, -1] 0.032 -0.008 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Flow[-6, -1]* Out[-6, -1] -1.655** -1.778** -1.818** -1.820*** 
 (0.682) (0.704) (0.710) (0.705) 
Flow[-12, -7]  -0.353 -0.340 -0.330 
  (0.351) (0.345) (0.337) 
Out[-12, -7]  0.113*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Flow[-12, -7]* Out[-12, -7]  0.604 0.651 0.609 
  (0.780) (0.785) (0.777) 
Flow[-24, -13]   -0.129 -0.125 
   (0.132) (0.128) 
Out[-24, -13]   0.045 0.046 
   (0.033) (0.033) 
Flow[-24, -13]* Out[-24, -13]   -0.306 -0.514 
   (1.012) (1.005) 
Flow[-36,-25]    0.004 
    (0.004) 
Out[-36,-25]    0.007 
    (0.033) 
Flow[-36,-25]* Out[-36,-25]    1.338 
    (1.105) 
Size(Ln) 0.018* 0.021** 0.023** 0.022** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age(Ln) 0.044* 0.030 0.020 0.023 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
     
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for Past Performance Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 89,215 89,215 89,215 89,215 





Table 6. Effects of Interaction of Past Performance and Flow on Sub-advisor 
Change 
 
This table presents estimated coefficients from Probit regressions. The dependent 
variable is the dummy variable that equals one if the fund changed its sub-advisor in 
month t and zero otherwise (Change). RetExCat[t1,t2] equals the monthly average return 
of a fund (before fees) in excess of that of all funds in the same category in months [t1, 
t2]. Flow[t1, t2] equals the monthly average percentage net flow into the fund in months 
[t1, t2]. Table 1 lists the detailed definitions and calculations of all variables in the 
regression. Observations are at the fund -month level. All estimations include year-month 
fixed effects. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation 
clustered at the fund level, and therefore the effective number of observations is on the 
order of number of funds. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significant at less than the 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
RetExCat[-6,-1] -6.352*** -7.455*** -7.098*** -7.207***
 (1.216) (1.295) (1.385) (1.423) 
Flow[-6,-1] -0.260 -0.404 -0.325 -1.200***
 (0.196) (0.330) (0.346) (0.420) 
RetExCat[-6,-1]* Flow[-6,-1] -10.358* -18.158 -16.701 -15.959 
 (5.731) (11.076) (12.092) (15.742) 
RetExCat[-12,-7]  -8.775*** -9.121*** -9.456***
  (1.273) (1.325) (1.394) 
Flow[-12, -7]  -0.003 0.029 -0.792** 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.363) 
RetExCat[-12,-7]* Flow[-12,-7]  1.398 1.436 15.694 
  (4.187) (2.976) (22.823) 
RetExCat[-24,-13]   -8.665*** -8.612***
   (2.345) (2.469) 
Flow[-24,-13]   -0.227** -0.345 
   (0.109) (0.346) 
RetExCat[-24,-13]* Flow[-24,-13]   17.565 15.972 
   (17.266) (32.061) 
RetExCat[-36,-25]    -7.169***
    (2.465) 
Flow[-36,-25]    0.041*** 
    (0.013) 
RetExCat[-36,-25]* Flow[-36,-25]    11.531***
    (3.518) 
Size(Ln) 0.014* 0.013 0.014 0.022** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Age(Ln) 0.031** 0.050*** 0.045** 0.042* 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.024) 
     
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127,625 115,238 105,781 89,215































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9. Effects of Size on Sub-advisor Performance 
 
This table presents estimated coefficients from baseline regression model. Observations 
are at the sub-advisor-month level. Dependent variable is sub-advisor return in excess of 
the category in the end of the month (RetExCat), in percentage. We calculate two 
measures to capture the size of a sub-advisor: the mandated assets in million dollars 
(Assets), and the mandated number of funds (Counts). RetExCat[-1] is sub-advisor return 
in excess of the category in the end of last month. Affiliation is the value weighted 
Affiliation score a sub-advisor gets from all of its mandated mutual funds. Index is the 
value weighted Index score a sub-advisor gets from all of its mandated mutual funds. 
FOF is the value weighted FOF score a sub-advisor gets from all of its mandated mutual 
funds. Equity is the value weighted Equity score a sub-advisor gets from all of its 
mandated mutual funds. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significant at less than the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Size Measure Assets Counts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Size -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.083*** -0.080*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) 
RetExCat[-1] 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Affiliation 0.192* 0.193** 0.215** 0.221** 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) 
Index -0.096 -0.104 -0.117 -0.132 
 (0.212) (0.212) (0.211) (0.211) 
FoF -0.043 -0.026 -0.067 -0.051 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Equity -0.103 -0.106 -0.060 -0.064 
 (0.083) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) 
     
Observations 41,454 41,454 41,454 41,454 
Sub-advisor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes 






Table 10. Effects of Size on Sub-advisor Performance: 
Equity Sub-advisor Only 
 
This table replicates the analyses of Table 8, except that the sample includes equity sub-
advisor only. Observations are at the sub-advisor-month level. Dependent variable is sub-
advisor return in excess of the category in the end of the month (RetExCat), in percentage. 
We calculate two measures to capture the size of a sub-advisor: the mandated assets in 
million dollars (Assets), and the mandated number of funds (Counts). RetExCat[-1] is 
sub-advisor return in excess of the category in the end of last month. Affiliation is the 
value weighted Affiliation score a sub-advisor gets from all of its mandated mutual funds. 
Index is the value weighted Index score a sub-advisor gets from all of its mandated 
mutual funds. FOF is the value weighted FOF score a sub-advisor gets from all of its 
mandated mutual funds. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significant at less than the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Size Measure Assets Counts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Size -0.092*** -0.103*** -0.124*** -0.122*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) 
RetExCat[-1] 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Affiliation 0.128 0.126 0.163 0.174 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.122) (0.123) 
Index -0.318 -0.332 -0.335 -0.364 
 (0.281) (0.281) (0.278) (0.277) 
FoF -0.005 0.024 -0.040 -0.018 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.115) (0.115) 
     
Observations 30,451 30,451 30,451 30,451 
Sub-advisor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes No Yes 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B. Essay 2 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
  
Variable Definition
Fund Level Data  
Age The number of years since a fund’s inception in 13F reporting. 
Flow The change in the value of a fund’s equity portfolio due to 
changes in investment by the fund over the quarter (and not due to 
the changes in the stock prices), calculated as ܨ݈݋ݓ௝,௧ ൌ
ሺܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ െ ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ିଵሺ1 ൅ ܴ݁ݐ௝,௧ሻሻ/ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ିଵ. It is a proxy for the 
net fund flows. 
Herfindahl The sum of the squared fractions of investments in each stock. 
Herfindahl is an indicator of fund concentration. 
Perct The fractional rank of a fund’s performance (Ret) ranging from 0 
to 1. 
PerfL The bottom rank of a fund’s return. It is calculated as the 
minimum of 0.5 and Perct. 
PerfH The top rank of a fund’s return. It is calculated as the minimum of 
0.5 and the difference between Perct and PerfL. 
Retail A dummy variable for whether a hedge fund is a retail-oriented 
fund. It equals one if individuals and wealthy individuals 
represent over 50% of its clients, and zero otherwise. 
Size Total stock holdings of a fund in millions of dollars. 
NumStocks The number of stocks in the hedge fund portfolio. 
Ret The value weighted return on a fund’s portfolio over the quarter. 
Turnover Trading unrelated to inflows or outflows. It is calculated as the 
minimum of the total values of buys and sells of a fund over the 
quarter scaled by the last quarter end total stock holdings, where 
buys (sells) are calculated as the sum of the products of positive 
(negative) changes in the number of shares in the holdings over 
the quarter and the previous stocks prices. 
Weight The market value of a fund’s holding in REITs scaled by the 
market value of a fund’s total holdings. 
Aggregate Data  
HFWeight(%Capital) The total market value of REITs held by hedge funds scaled by 
the total hedge fund holdings. 
HFWeight(%Shares) The total shares of REITs held by hedge funds scaled by the total 
shares of stocks held by all hedge funds. 
MktWeight(%Capital) The total market capital of REITs scaled by the total market 
capital of all stocks in NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX markets. 
MktWeight(%Shares) The total shares outstanding of REITs scaled by the total shares 
outstanding of all stocks in NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX markets. 
NumMgrs The number of hedge funds with a valid 13F filing. 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Implied Weights from Return Regressions 
This table presents the results of time-series regressions of monthly hedge fund index 
returns on ܴெ,௧, the CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq market index, and 
ܴோாூ்௦,௧ െ ܴெ,௧, the REITs return in excess of the market return (the excess REITs 
factor), as in Equation: 
 
 ܴ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܴெ,௧ ൅ ߛ൫ܴோாூ்௦,௧ െ ܴெ,௧൯ ൅ ߝ௧ 
The sample period is January 2003 to June 2007. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significant at 
less than the 1% level. I use β and γ estimates to compute wREITs, the implied ratio of 
net investments in REITs to net investments in stocks overall as in Equation: 
 
 ݓோாூ்௦ ൌ ݉ோாூ்௦ ൅ ߛߚ ሺ1 െ ݉ோாூ்௦ሻ 
The dependent variables in Panel A are returns on HFR style indexes, classified by 
HFR as follows: Equity Hedge funds invest in core holding of long equities, hedged 
at all times with short sales of stocks and/or stock index options. Market Neutral 
funds seeks to profit by exploiting pricing inefficiencies between related equity 
securities, neutralizing exposure to market risk by combining long and short 
positions. Event Driven funds target on corporate transactions such as mergers, 
financial distressing, tender offers etc. Macro involves investing by making 
leveraged bets on anticipated price movements of stock markets, interest rates, 
foreign exchange, and physical commodities. Arbitrage focuses on exploiting pricing 
anomalies on equity, fixed income, derivative and other security types. Short Bias 
specializes in short-selling securities. Real Estate funds emphasize investment in 
securities of the real estate arena. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the monthly 
















 Factor Loading Adj. R2 Implied Weight
  			ߚ  ߛ   
  Panel A: HFR Hedge Fund Style Indexes (2003.01-2007.06) 
Equity Hedge 0.446*** -0.015 0.610 0.013 
 (0.06) (0.03)   
Market Neutral -0.020 0.019 0.014 0.013 
 (0.04) (0.04)   
Event Driven 0.401*** -0.023 0.669 0.013 
 (0.04) (0.02)   
Macro 0.384*** 0.002 0.274 0.013 
 (0.10) (0.07)   
Arbitrage 0.111*** 0.014 0.169 0.013 
 (0.04) (0.03)   
Short Bias -1.096*** -0.062 0.874  
 (0.09) (0.05)   
Real Estate 0.644*** 0.214*** 0.615 0.341 
 (0.09) (0.06)   
  Panel B: Aggregate Long portfolio (2003.01-2007.06) 
13F All 1.135*** 0.005 0.962 0.013 







C. Essay 3 
Table 1: Effects of Investor Composition on Investment  
This table presents the coefficient estimates of Equation (1) in the real estate 
sample (2003Q1 to 2009Q1): 
 
ܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ௝,௧ ൌ ߚܱݒ݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ ൅ ߛܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ ൅ ߜܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ܱݒ݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ 	൅ 	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߝ௝,௧	  
Overprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is between 
2003Q1 and 2007Q2 (the period of real estate overpricing) and zero otherwise. 
Definitions of all other variables are listed in Table 1 of Essay 2. Observations are at 
the fund-quarter level. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and within-
cluster correlation at the fund level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significant at 
less than the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overprice 0.046 0.020 0.563 0.624 
 (0.299) (0.245) (0.755) (0.656) 
Retail*Overprice 0.489* 0.454* 0.480* 0.433* 
 (0.285) (0.254) (0.290) (0.261) 
Retail 0.007  0.024  
 (0.305)  (0.304)  
Herfindahl -15.411*** -11.592*** -14.399*** -10.064*** 
 (2.318) (3.023) (2.338) (3.059) 
Turnover -0.378** 0.000 -0.378** -0.033 
 (0.169) (0.137) (0.169) (0.139) 
Herfindahl*Overprice 3.048 5.807* 2.270 5.047* 
 (2.808) (2.994) (3.053) (3.019) 
Turnover*Overprice 0.273 0.269 0.277 0.278* 
 (0.186) (0.165) (0.185) (0.163) 
Size   0.097 0.179* 
   (0.082) (0.099) 
Size*Overprice   -0.077 -0.086 
   (0.095) (0.085) 
Constant 0.926*** 1.019*** 0.265 -0.189 
 (0.295) (0.187) (0.612) (0.701) 
     
Fund Dummy NO YES NO YES 
Observations 8,216 8,216 8,216 8,216 





Table 2: Effects of Investor Composition: Technology Sample  
This table presents the coefficient estimates of Equation (1) in the technology 
sample (1998Q1 to 2002Q4): 
 
ܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ௝,௧ ൌ ߚܱݒ݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ ൅ ߛܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ ൅ ߜܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ܱݒ݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ 	൅ 	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௧ ൅ ߝ௝,௧	  
 Overprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is between 1998Q1 
and 2000Q4 (the technology overpricing period) and zero otherwise. Definitions of 
all other variables are listed in Table 1 of Essay 2. Analyses from Table 1 (of this 
essay) are replicated on the technology sample. Observations are at the fund-quarter 
level. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation at 
the fund level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significant at less than the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overprice 2.116** 1.821** -3.138 -1.447 
 (0.857) (0.799) (3.126) (2.495) 
Retail*Overprice 2.391** 3.202*** 2.105* 2.952*** 
 (1.150) (0.973) (1.184) (0.991) 
Retail 1.073  1.060  
 (1.462)  (1.479)  
Herfindahl -38.561*** -0.380 -38.092*** 2.579 
 (9.562) (6.489) (10.257) (7.541) 
Turnover -0.632 0.136 -0.634 -0.059 
 (0.959) (0.558) (0.957) (0.555) 
Herfindahl*Overprice -31.418** -21.205 -21.876 -16.446 
 (14.687) (14.126) (14.463) (14.134) 
Turnover*Overprice 0.515 0.500 0.459 0.475 
 (0.759) (0.606) (0.769) (0.614) 
Size   0.044 1.198** 
   (0.495) (0.510) 
Size*Overprice   0.818* 0.512 
   (0.490) (0.398) 
Constant 11.309*** 0.949 11.031*** -4.608 
 (0.941) (0.900) (3.282) (2.912) 
     
Fund Dummy NO YES NO YES 
Observations 3,598 3,598 3,598 3,598 





Table 3: Effects of Investor Composition on Flow-Performance Sensitivity 
This table presents the coefficient estimates of Equation (5) from 2003Q1 to 
2009Q1: 
 
ܨ݈݋ݓ௝,௧ ൌ ߚ௅ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ିଵ௅ ൅ ߚுܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ିଵு ൅ ߛ௅ܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ ∙ ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ିଵ௅ ൅ ߛுܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ ∙
																																		ܲ݁ݎ ௝݂,௧ିଵு ൅ ܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ ൅ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௝,௧ 
 
Definitions of all variables are listed in Table 1 of Essay 2. Observations are at 
the fund-quarter level. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and within-
cluster correlation at the fund level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significant at 
less than the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PerfL -0.032 -0.032 -0.029 -0.028 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
PerfH 0.040 0.040 0.037 0.036 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Retail*PerfL 0.072* 0.073* 0.072* 0.070* 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
Retail*PerfH -0.051 -0.052 -0.051 -0.049 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
Retail -0.033** -0.030* -0.029* -0.029* 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Size -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Turnover 0.015*** 0.014** 0.014** 0.013** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age  -0.010** -0.010** -0.009* 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Herfindahl   0.031 0.030 
   (0.087) (0.087) 
Flow(-1)    0.012 
    (0.019) 
Constant 0.112*** 0.120*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) 
     
Observations 8216 8216 8216 8216 





Table 4: Effects of Investor Composition on Flow Volatility  
This table presents the coefficient estimates of Equation (6): 
 
 ܸ݋݈ி௟௢௪ೕ ൌ γܴ݁ݐܽ݅ ௝݈ ൅ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝ ൅ ߝ௝  
In Column (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the volatility of fund flows for each 
hedge fund from 2003Q1 to 2009Q1. In Column (4) to (6), the dependent variable is 
the volatility of absolute fund flows for each hedge fund during this sample period. 
All control variables in this regression are sample averages of the fund 
characteristics as defined in Table 1 of Essay 2. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. *, ** and ***indicate statistical significant at less than the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  
 Volatility of Flows  Volatility of Absolute Flows 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Retail 0.012** 0.013** 0.016*** 0.006** 0.007** 0.008** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Turnover 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Herfindahl 0.432*** 0.444*** 0.434*** 0.206*** 0.212*** 0.210*** 
 (0.093) (0.095) (0.094) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) 
Size  0.003 0.004**  0.002 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Age   -0.012**   -0.002 
   (0.005)   (0.003) 
Constant 0.036*** 0.017 0.037** 0.035*** 0.024** 0.028** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.017) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) 
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Appendix: List of REITs 
 
Company Name Ticker Company Name Ticker 
A G Mortgage Investment Tr Inc MITT Host Marriott Corp New HMT 
A M B Property Corp AMB Hudson Pacific Properties Inc HPP 
Aames Investment Corp Md AIC Humphrey Hospitality Trust Inc HUMP 
Aegis Realty Inc AER I R T Property Co IRT 
Affordable Residential Cmntys Inc ARC Impac Mortgage Holdings Inc IMH 
Agree Realty Corp ADC Inland Real Estate Corp IRC 
Alesco Financial Inc AFN Invesco Mortgage Capital Inc IVR 
Alexanders Inc ALX Istar Financial Inc SFI 
Alexandria Real Est Equities Inc ARE J D N Realty Corp JDN 
America First Apt Inv Inc APRO J E R Investors Trust Inc JRT 
American Assets Trust Inc AAT Jameson Inns Inc JAMS 
American Campus Communities Inc ACC K K R Financial Corp KFN 
American Capital Agency Corp AGNC Kilroy Realty Corp KRC 
American Capital Mtg Invt Corp MTGE Kimco Realty Corp KIM 
American Community Pptys Tr APO Kite Realty Group Trust KRG 
American Home Mortgage Invt Corp AHH Koger Equity Inc KE 
American Home Mortgage Invt Corp AHM L T C Properties Inc LTC 
American Land Lease Inc ANL La Quinta Corp LQI 
American Realty Capital Prop Inc ARCP Lexington Corporate Pptys Trust LXP 
Amerivest Properties Inc AMV Lexington Realty Trust LXP 
Amreit AMY Longview Fibre Co LFB 
Annaly Capital Management Inc NLY Luminent Mortgage Capital Inc LUM 
Annaly Mortgage Management Inc NLY M F A Financial Inc MFA 
Anthracite Capital Inc AHR M F A Mortgage Investments Inc MFA 
Anworth Mortgage Asset Corp ANH M H I Hospitality Corp MDH 
Apartment Investment & Mgmt Co AIV M P G Office Trust Inc MPG 
Apex Mortgage Capital Inc AXM Macerich Co MAC 
Apollo Commercial Rl Est Fin Inc ARI Mack Cali Realty Corp CLI 
Apollo Residential Mortgage Inc AMTG Maguire Properties Inc MPG 
Arbor Realty Trust Inc ABR Malan Realty Investors Inc MAL 
Arden Realty Inc ARI Manufactured Home Communities In MHC 
Arizona Land Income Corp AZL Maxus Realty Trust Inc MRTI 
Armour Residential Reit Inc ARR Medical Properties Trust Inc MPW 
Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc AHT Meredith Enterprises Inc MPQ 
Associated Estates Realty Corp AEC Meristar Hospitality Corp MHX 
Avalonbay Communities Inc AVB Mid America Apt Communities Inc MAA 
B N P Residential Properties Inc BNP Middleton Doll Company DOLL 
B R E Properties Inc BRE Mills Corp MLS 
Bedford Property Investors Inc BED Mission West Pptys Inc Md MSW 
Bimini Capital Management Inc BMN Monmouth Real Estate Invt Corp MNR 
Bimini Mortgage Management Inc BMM Monmouth Real Estate Invt Corp MNRTA
Biomed Realty Trust Inc BMR Mortgageit Holdings Inc MHL 
Boston Properties Inc BXP National Golf Properties Inc TEE 
Boykin Lodging Co BOY National Health Investors Inc NHI 





C B R E Realty Finance Inc CBF National Retail Properties Inc NNN 
C R T Properties Inc CRO Nationwide Health Properties Inc NHP 
C Y S Investments Inc CYS New Century Financial Corp Md NEW 
Campus Crest Communities Inc CCG New Plan Excel Realty Trust Inc NXL 
Capital Alliance Income Trust Lt CAA New York Mortgage Trust Inc NTR 
Capital Lease Funding Inc LSE New York Mortgage Trust Inc NYMT 
Capitalsource Inc CSE Newcastle Investment Corp NCT 
Caplease Inc LSE Newkirk Realty Trust Inc NKT 
Capstead Mortgage Corp CMO Northstar Realty Finance Corp NRF 
Care Investment Trust Inc CRE Novastar Financial Inc NFI 
Carramerica Realty Corp CRE Omega Healthcare Investors Inc OHI 
Catellus Development Corp New CDX One Liberty Properties Inc OLP 
Cedar Income Fund Ltd New CEDR Opteum Inc OPX 
Cedar Realty Trust Inc CDR Origen Financial Inc ORGN 
Cedar Shopping Centers Inc CDR P S Business Parks Inc Ca PSB 
Cedar Shopping Centers Inc CEDR Pacific Office Pptys Trust Inc PCE 
Center Trust Inc CTA Pan Pacific Retail Properties In PNP 
Chateau Communities Inc CPJ Parkway Properties Inc PKY 
Chelsea Property Group Inc CPG Piedmont Office Realty Trust Inc PDM 
Chimera Investment Corp CIM Plum Creek Timber Co Inc PCL 
Cogdell Spencer Inc CSA Post Properties Inc PPS 
Colony Financial Inc CLNY Potlatch Corp PCH 
Columbia Equity Trust Inc COE Potlatch Corp New PCH 
Commercial Net Lease Realty Inc NNN Preferred Apartment Cmntys Inc APTS 
Coresite Realty Corp COR Presidential Realty Corp New PDL 
Cornerstone Realty Income Tr Inc TCR Price Legacy Corp PLRE 
Corporate Office Properties Tr OFC Price Legacy Corp XLG 
Cousins Properties Inc CUZ Prologis Inc PLD 
Crescent Real Estate Equities Co CEI Public Storage PSA 
Crexus Investment Corp CXS Public Storage Inc PSA 
Criimi Mae Inc CMM Quadra Realty Trust Inc QRR 
Crystal River Capital Inc CRZ R F S Hotel Investors Inc RFS 
Cypress Sharpridge Invts Inc CYS Rayonier Inc RYN 
D C T Industrial Trust Inc DCT Realty Income Corp O 
D D R Corp DDR Reckson Associates Realty Corp RA 
Deerfield Capital Corp DFR Redwood Trust Inc RWT 
Deerfield Triarc Capital Corp DFR Regency Centers Corp REG 
Developers Diversified Rlty Corp DDR Republic Property Trust RPB 
Diamondrock Hospitality Co DRH Resource Capital Corp RSO 
Digital Realty Trust Inc DLR Retail Opportunity Invst Corp NAQ 
Douglas Emmett Inc DEI Retail Opportunity Invst Corp ROIC 
Duke Realty Corp DRE Roberts Realty Investors Inc RPI 
Dupont Fabros Technology Inc DFT Rouse Company RSE 
Dynex Capital Inc DX S L Green Realty Corp SLG 
E C C Capital Corp ECR Sabra Healthcare Reit Inc SBRA 
Eagle Hospitality Pptys Tr Inc EHP Saul Centers Inc BFS 
Eastern Light Capital Inc ELC Saxon Capital Inc New SAX 
Eastgroup Properties Inc EGP Saxon Capital Inc New SAXN 
Education Realty Trust Inc EDR Shelbourne Properties I Inc HXD 
Equity Inns Inc ENN Shelbourne Properties Ii Inc HXE 





Equity One Inc EQY Shurgard Storage Centers Inc SHU 
Essex Property Trust Inc ESS Simon Property Group Inc New SPG 
Excel Trust Inc EXL Sizeler Property Investors Inc SIZ 
Extra Space Storage Inc EXR Sovran Self Storage Inc SSS 
F B R Asset Investment Corp FB Spirit Finance Corp SFC 
Felcor Lodging Trust Inc FCH Stag Industrial Inc STAG 
Feldman Mall Properties Inc FMP Stag Industrial Inc STIR 
Fieldstone Investment Corp FICC Starwood Property Trust Inc STWD 
First Industrial Realty Tr Inc FR Strategic Hotel Capital Inc SLH 
Fog Cutter Capital Group Inc FCCG Strategic Hotels & Resorts Inc BEE 
Franklin Street Properties Corp FSP Summit Hotel Properties Inc INN 
Friedman Billings Ramsey Grp New FBR Summit Properties Inc SMT 
General Growth Pptys Inc New GGP Sun Communities Inc SUI 
General Growth Properties Inc GGP Sunset Financial Resources Inc SFO 
Getty Realty Corp New GTY Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc New SHO 
Gladstone Commercial Corp GOOD Supertel Hospitality Inc SPPR 
Glenborough Realty Tr Inc GLB Tanger Factory Outlet Centers In SKT 
Global Signal Inc GSL Taubman Centers Inc TCO 
Government Properties Income Tr GOV Terreno Realty Corp TRNO 
Government Properties Trust Inc GPP Thornburg Mortgage Inc TMA 
Government Properties Trust Inc GPT Trizec Properties Inc TRZ 
Gramercy Capital Corp GKK Trustreet Properties Inc TSY 
Gyrodyne Company America Inc GYRO Two Harbors Investment Corp TWO 
H C P Inc HCP U D R Inc UDR 
H M G Courtland Properties Ltd HMG U M H Properties Inc UMH 
Hanover Capital Mtg Hldgs Inc HCM U S Restaurants Properties Inc USV 
Hatteras Financial Corp HTS United Dominion Realty Tr Inc UDR 
Health Care Ppty Invs Inc HCP United Mobile Homes Inc UMH 
Health Care Reit Inc HCN Urstadt Biddle Properties Inc UBA 
Healthcare Realty Trust Inc HR Urstadt Biddle Properties Inc UBP 
Heritage Property Invest Tr Inc HTG Ventas Inc VTR 
Highland Hospitality Corp HIH Vestin Realty Mortgage I Inc VRTA 
Highwoods Properties Inc HIW Vestin Realty Mortgage Ii Inc VRTB 
Home Properties Inc HME Walter Investment Mgmt Corp WAC 
Home Properties N Y Inc HME West Coast Realty Investors Inc MPQ 
Homebanc Corp Ga HMB Weyerhaeuser Co WY 
Horizon Group Properties Inc HGPI Windrose Medical Pptys Tr WRS 
Host Hotels & Resorts Inc HST Winston Hotels Inc WXH 
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